Part four, Summary: The root cause of most antisemitic attacks comes from a belief in conspiracy theories. There are limited ways of combatting it.
Israel has become a catalyst for people already primed to see the world through conspiracy theories. They imagine Jews acting as a single force, secretly controlling media, finance, and governments for their own benefit. Israel gives this old story a contemporary focus: anger at a Jewish state becomes suspicion of Jews everywhere.
Politicians and entertainers help give these ideas a public voice. Rep. Rashida Tlaib spoke of “the same people” profiting “from Gaza to Detroit”; and Rep. Ilhan Omar dismissed support for Israel as “all about the Benjamins.” Musician Ye claimed “Jewish people have owned the Black voice”; and Roger Waters called the “Jewish lobby” extraordinarily powerful in the music business. Actor Mel Gibson blamed Jews for “all the wars in the world,” while French comedian Dieudonné called Jews a “sect.”
Social media carries these claims to young audiences. The United Nations give them institutional authority when antisemitic theories enter official reports. The three-part series traced that path:
The next question is harder: how do we stop conspiracy theories from taking hold? The evidence offers little reason for easy confidence. A 2026 meta-analysis of 56 study samples found only a small average effect from interventions, with much of the underlying research carrying a high risk of bias. Still, “fact-checking conspiracy claims,” was viewed favorably.
Prebunking – teaching people to recognize manipulation before they encounter it – is one promising approach according to the ADL, but its success is limited. A classroom study found that a 45-minute lesson presenting antisemitism as a recurring conspiracy reduced students’ endorsement of several antisemitic tropes. The finding offers a practical lead, not a settled solution.
Conspiracy theories about Jews have endured by adapting to each new crisis. In a post-COVID world shaped by distrust, social media incentives, and increasingly capable Artificial Intelligence, they are likely to find new audiences and spread faster.
This is Part Three of a series examining the surge in antisemitism: Conspiracy theories magnified at the United Nations
In May 2021, Pakistan, acting on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, introduced a resolution at the United Nations Human Rights Council establishing a permanent commission to investigate Israel and the Palestinian territories. It passed 24–9, with 14 abstentions. China, Russia, Cuba, Pakistan and Venezuela supported it. Germany, Austria and the United Kingdom opposed it. Neither Israel nor the United States voted, as neither was a council member.
Graffiti on Florida’s Holocaust Memorial in May 2021
The commission received a sweeping mandate to investigate alleged violations of international law and the historical causes of the conflict. Its mandate had no expiration date – a highly unusual move.
Three commissioners were appointed in July 2021: Navi Pillay of South Africa, a former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, as chair; Miloon Kothari of India, a former UN Special Rapporteur on housing; and Chris Sidoti, a former Australian Human Rights Commissioner.
A year later, Kothari publicly repeated antisemitic conspiracy theories about Jewish power while questioning Israel’s place in the United Nations.
The Jewish Lobby Controls What People Read
In July 2022, Kothari spoke with Mondoweiss, a publication strongly critical of Israel. Complaining about opposition to his commission, he declared: “We are very disheartened by the social media that is controlled largely by – whether it is the Jewish lobby or specific NGOs.”
He also alleged that substantial money was being spent to discredit the investigators.
For centuries, antisemites have claimed that Jews secretly control newspapers, publishing, entertainment and public opinion. Kothari updated that conspiracy for social media, coupling supposed Jewish control of information with financial power.
These were central themes of the fabricated Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which portrayed Jews as manipulating society through the press, finance and politics. Nazi propaganda later exploited these accusations to depict Jews as dangerous enemies of society.
These remarks came from one of three UN officials entrusted with investigating the Jewish state.
Miloon Kothari
Jewish Influence and International Accountability
Kothari also accused Israel of undermining the United Nations: “They, in fact, consistently, either directly or through the United States, try to undermine UN mechanisms.”
His allegations followed a familiar antisemitic narrative: Jewish influence over information, money and powerful governments supposedly shielding Israel from accountability.
Kothari also suggested that accusations of antisemitism were used against critics of Israel. Under this reasoning, objections to antisemitic statements become further evidence of the supposed conspiracy.
When an investigator sees criticism as evidence of a Jewish conspiracy, he has already found a reason to dismiss those who challenge his conclusions.
From Criticizing Israel to Questioning Its Legitimacy
Kothari went further: “I would go as far as to raise the question of why [Israel is] even a member of the United Nations.” He argued that Israel failed to respect its international obligations.
His historical interpretation was equally expansive: “What has transpired in the occupied territories since ’67 is something that had already been happening inside the Green Line since ’48”
Kothari explained that the commission was examining human rights “from the river to the sea” and added: “There are similarities inside and outside Green Line, so linkages must be made.”
He also argued that apartheid alone was insufficient to explain the conflict and that the commission needed to examine “settler-colonialism.” His framework placed Israel’s founding, rather than particular government decisions, at the center of the commission’s indictment.
From Personal Prejudice to UN Findings
Not surprisingly, the commission’s first report, issued in June 2022 under Kothari, emphasized systematic discrimination, territorial control and historical causes of the conflict. Kothari explained the commission’s ambitions: “Our work is to collect a repository of all the evidence that we gather.”
He said the material could eventually be handed to judicial bodies. Commission members had already met with officials at the International Criminal Court, including a deputy prosecutor, and contemplated approaching governments about arms transfers and companies operating in Israeli settlements.
The investigation was designed to influence international legal proceedings, diplomatic pressure and commercial relationships.
The commission’s October 14, 2026 report demonstrated how its historical framework endured. Paragraph 58 begins: “Since the 1947-48 war, Israel has continuously striven to expand territorially and displace Palestinians through violence.” The report attributes Israeli actions across generations to territorial expansion, demographic control and discrimination.
Four years earlier, Kothari had connected events in 1948 and 1967 through the same historical interpretation. The new report, issued under different commissioners, carried that framework forward, expressly directing readers to consider its earlier investigations.
An interpretation advanced by a commissioner who publicly invoked antisemitic conspiracy theories had become part of the commission’s continuing institutional narrative.
The Apology and the Institution That Remained
Kothari’s remarks in Mondoweiss drew condemnation from American officials, including Deborah Lipstadt, the US Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism, and Ambassador Michèle Taylor. European governments, Canadian officials and Jewish organizations also criticized him. Human Rights Council President Federico Villegas warned that Kothari’s comments could stigmatize Jewish people.
Commission chair Navi Pillay defended Kothari, arguing that his remarks had been misrepresented. Yet Kothari himself apologized in August 2022, acknowledging that describing social media as largely controlled by a Jewish lobby was wrong. He also clarified that he did not question Israel’s existence or advocate its expulsion from the UN.
On October 26, 2026, it publicized its October 14 report accusing Israel of genocide in Gaza, crimes against humanity in the West Bank and deliberately targeting Palestinian children. Its historical account portrayed Israeli policy since 1948 as a continuing project of territorial expansion and Palestinian displacement.
Once incorporated into successive UN reports, contested historical interpretations acquire the appearance of independently verified facts, available for citation by governments, universities and political movements. The commission also recommended action by other countries and international institutions concerning Israel’s policies.
Kothari’s antisemitic conspiracy theories prompted an apology but little institutional reckoning. The investigations he helped shape became the foundation for successive UN reports, accumulating authority long after his departure and influencing global opinion, diplomatic campaigns and potentially international legal proceedings against Israel.
The UN allowed antisemitic conspiracy theories to take root in its reports, turning them into foundational texts for a new wave of anti-Israel invective cloaked in international authority.
This is Part One of a series examining the surge in antisemitism, starting with an analytical perspective, and following it to find its basis and track its progression.
Ten countries, six years of data, and a striking change in the global pattern
Antisemitism is often discussed through individual incidents: an attack on a synagogue, harassment of Jewish students, vandalism of a Jewish business, or threats directed at Jewish families. Each event tells us something about the experiences of Jews in a particular place. Looking at thousands of incidents across several countries and multiple years can tell us something different.
It can reveal patterns.
Memorial site for Jews gunned down during a Chanukah celebration in Sydney, Australia
I examined reported antisemitic incidents in ten countries over six years, from 2019 through 2024. The objective was to understand how antisemitism changed over time, whether countries followed similar trajectories, and what happened around October 7, 2023, when the political-terrorist group Hamas attacked Israel and the subsequent war began.
I began with the numbers themselves, before considering possible explanations.
The Ten Countries
The ten countries chosen were the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, Australia, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Argentina. Each has an established Jewish community of more than 25,000 people and an organization or government agency that regularly publishes statistics on antisemitic incidents. Together, they provide a geographically diverse sample spanning North America, South America, Europe and Australia.
The countries also offer useful differences. Their Jewish populations range from tens of thousands to millions. They have different political systems, histories, cultures and approaches to recording antisemitism.
Before October 7, the ten countries were moving in different directions. Some had experienced years of increasing antisemitism, while others had seen substantial declines. By 2024, every one of them was reporting more antisemitic incidents than in 2022.
What could explain such a consistent change across countries with such different histories?
I used statistics from the Anti-Defamation League in the United States, Community Security Trust in Britain, the French Interior Ministry, German police, B’nai Brith Canada, the Executive Council of Australian Jewry, Italy’s CDEC, the Netherlands’ CIDI and Argentina’s DAIA.
What Happened Between 2019 and 2024?
The first question was straightforward: how many antisemitic incidents were recorded each year?
Country
2019
2022
2024
Change 2022–2024
United States
2,107
3,697
9,354
+153%
United Kingdom
1,805
1,662
3,528
+112%
France
687
436
1,570
+260%
Germany
2,032
2,641
6,236
+136%
Canada
2,207
2,769
6,219
+125%
Australia*
368
478
2,062
+331%
Italy
251
241
877
+264%
Netherlands
182
155
421
+172%
Argentina
918
427
687
+61%
Belgium
92
34
129
+279%
Australia uses reporting years ending in September. Its 2024 period covers October 2023 through September 2024. Figures reflect national reporting systems with different definitions and coverage.
Taken together, there were roughly 12,500 antisemitic incidents in 2022 and 31,000 in 2024, an increase of approximately 148%. Although reporting definitions vary between countries, the combined total offers another perspective on the scale of the increase.
Every country recorded more incidents in 2024 than in 2022.
The increases ranged from 61% in Argentina to more than 300% in Australia. The median increase was approximately 153%, meaning the middle country experienced roughly two and a half times as many recorded incidents in 2024 as in 2022.
Yet the countries had arrived at 2022 by very different paths.
Some Countries Had Been Rising. Others Had Been Declining.
Between 2019 and 2022, antisemitic incidents increased in four countries: the United States, Germany, Canada and Australia. The United States experienced particularly substantial growth, with incidents rising 75%.
The other six countries were moving in the opposite direction. France recorded 687 incidents in 2019 and 436 in 2022, a decline of 37%. Argentina fell from 918 to 427, a decline of 53%. Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands also recorded lower totals in 2022 than in 2019.
Despite their trajectories, all ten countries had experienced substantial increases from their 2022 levels.
We tested whether countries with the fastest increases before 2023 also experienced the fastest increases afterward. The statistical relationship was extremely weak, with a correlation of just +0.13.
In practical terms, knowing whether a country’s antisemitism had previously been rising or falling told us remarkably little about the size of its subsequent increase.
How Unusual Was the Increase?
I next compared the 2024 figures with the historical patterns established between 2019 and 2022. I tested three approaches: comparing 2024 with the earlier four-year average, extending the earlier trend forward in a straight line, and projecting the earlier compound annual growth rate.
Every country recorded 2024 totals ABOVE all three benchmarks.
The size of the difference varied depending on the method, particularly in countries where earlier incidents had been declining. Extending a short downward trend can produce unrealistically low projections, so no single forecast should be treated as a definitive estimate of what would otherwise have happened.
But the important finding is that the conclusion remained consistent when we changed the mathematical assumptions: 2024 was substantially above the levels suggested by earlier reporting patterns.
When Did the Pattern Change?
Annual totals show the scale of a change. Monthly figures help establish its timing.
In France, 39 antisemitic incidents were recorded in October 2022. In October 2023, the number was 563, more than fourteen times as many. October 2024 recorded 157 incidents, substantially below the extraordinary October 2023 peak but still approximately four times the October 2022 level.
Britain offers another useful comparison. Community Security Trust reported an average of approximately 154 incidents per month during the year preceding October 7, 2023. The average during 2024 was approximately 294 per month, an increase of 91%.
Australia recorded 495 incidents in the reporting year ending September 2023 and 2,062 in the following reporting year, which began six days before the Hamas attack. That represents more than a fourfold increase.
These observations show two related developments: a dramatic initial increase around October 2023 and continued elevated reporting levels during 2024.
The timing is particularly interesting because the countries were experiencing the same international event despite having different domestic histories and earlier antisemitism trends.
Was the Increase Temporary?
A sudden event can produce a brief surge in incidents that quickly subsides. It can also be followed by a more lasting change.
The 2023 and 2024 numbers allow us to begin distinguishing those possibilities.
Britain, France and Belgium recorded fewer incidents in 2024 than in 2023, indicating that their initial peaks had moderated. Yet all remained substantially above their 2022 levels.
The United States, Germany, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands and Argentina recorded higher totals in 2024 than in 2023. Australia’s reporting calendar places nearly the entire first post-October 7 year in its 2024 total.
Thus, the immediate surge was followed by different national trajectories, but elevated incident levels persisted across the sample through 2024.
What Have We Learned?
The ten countries began with different histories, different Jewish populations and different trajectories. Yet all experienced substantial increases in recorded antisemitism during the same period. The available monthly records place the sharpest change around October 2023, with elevated levels continuing through 2024.
The statistical pattern is plainly visible. Antisemitic attacks have always existed but spiked around the world after October 7, 2023. People around the world came for their local Jews who had nothing to do with an event thousands of miles away. This is a unique global phenomena, as people do not attack other diaspora communities for wars involving their homelands anywhere else.
Israel held five national elections between April 2019 and November 2022, an exhausting cycle that cost billions of shekels, distracted the country from pressing challenges and produced a succession of short-lived governments.
The problem lies partly in Israel’s parliamentary system. Parties must win at least 3.25% of the national vote to enter the 120-seat Knesset. Forming a stable government generally requires a coalition of at least 61 members, giving smaller parties considerable leverage over larger ones.
When coalition negotiations fail, Israel can return to the polls under essentially the same rules, often producing another fragmented parliament and another round of political paralysis.
What if Israel changed the rules to make political deadlock increasingly costly for the politicians responsible?
Here is a proposal:
the first election would retain the existing 3.25% threshold. If no government could be formed, a second election would raise the threshold to 5%, encouraging smaller parties to merge, form alliances or consolidate around larger political blocs.
Each major party or bloc would designate both a primary and an alternate candidate for prime minister before the second election. The primary candidates would have a defined period to assemble a governing coalition. If they failed, their designated alternates would receive a fresh negotiating period, while the original candidates would lose their opportunity to become prime minister during that government-formation process.
This could be particularly consequential in Israel, where political deadlock has frequently centered on personalities as well as policy. During the 2019–2022 elections, opposition to Benjamin Netanyahu personally contributed to repeated deadlock, even among parties sharing substantial policy positions.
Under the proposed system, Likud could retain its electoral strength while another leader attempted to assemble a government. Rival blocs would face the same pressure to compromise. Negotiators could also agree to rotate the premiership after two years, sharing leadership over a four-year term.
If both leadership rounds failed, a third election would raise the threshold to 7%. Smaller parties would face even greater pressure to consolidate, while larger parties would have to reconsider whether their leadership disputes justified another election.
The rising threshold carries a cost: smaller political constituencies could lose direct representation. Joint electoral lists would offer a way to preserve their voices while encouraging broader political alliances.
Israel’s electoral system currently allows political leaders to return to voters without fundamentally changing the conditions that produced the deadlock. A rising electoral threshold, combined with leadership succession, would make each failure more consequential.
Voters should choose the country’s political direction. Politicians should be responsible for forming a government. When negotiations fail, the burden of compromise should fall on those seeking power, rather than repeatedly on the citizens who elected them.
The New York Times has once again turned the Middle East conflict upside down.
In an article titled “For Israel’s Neighbors, the Election Offers Little Hope of a Reset,” the newspaper features a photograph of destruction in Lebanon, and that Israel’s election offers “little hope” that relations will improve with the Jewish State.
The message is unmistakable. Israel is the problem. Its neighbors are waiting for Israelis to elect someone more accommodating.
But Hezbollah attacked Israel. Hamas attacked Israel. Both organizations have pursued Israel’s destruction.
Hamas invaded Israel on October 7, 2023, slaughtering civilians and taking hostages. Hezbollah opened another front the following day, firing rockets into Israel.
Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000 and removed its civilians and permanent ground forces from Gaza in 2005. Neither withdrawal brought peace. Hezbollah rearmed, while Hamas built an extensive terrorist infrastructure in Gaza.
Meanwhile, Israel has made peace with Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco. Those countries chose coexistence over confrontation.
The Times could examine why Hezbollah continues to threaten Israel, why Hamas rejects the Jewish state, or why Iran finances and arms organizations dedicated to attacking it. Instead, it places the burden of regional peace on the outcome of Israeli elections.
The Times fails to comprehend that jihadists cannot accept a Jewish State “in any part of Palestine,” as radical Muslims have made clear for a century. Reorienting that narrative is either propaganda or the sign of a fool. Both tell readers to go elsewhere for something intelligent to consider.
On October 27, 2026, Israel witnessed an extraordinary demonstration of democracy. Preliminary estimates put Israeli Arab voter turnout at approximately 80%, potentially exceeding that of Israeli Jews. Nearly a million Israeli Arabs may have voted, with Arab-led parties projected to win 17 to 18 seats in Israel’s 120-member Knesset. It was among the highest Arab turnouts in decades.
The New York Times chose a different story. Adam Rasgon’s headline declared: “Israeli elections have great consequences for Palestinians, but they don’t get to vote.”
On a day of remarkable Arab political participation, the Times focused on Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank who cannot vote in Israeli elections – who aren’t Israeli citizens. An achievement of Israeli democracy became another story of Israeli power and exclusion.
The last Palestinian parliamentary election took place in January 2006, when the US- designated foreign terrorist group Hamas defeated Fatah. The last presidential election was in January 2005, when Mahmoud Abbas, who wrote his doctoral thesis on Holocaust denial, won a four-year term that expired in 2009. He remains president today.
Hamas violently seized control of Gaza in 2007, while the Palestinian Authority continued governing parts of the West Bank. Neither has renewed its national electoral mandate. An entire generation of Palestinians has reached adulthood without electing its national leadership.
That’s not a story for the Times.
Meanwhile, Israeli Arabs regularly elect representatives to the Knesset, organize opposition parties and participate in governing coalitions. In 2021, Mansour Abbas’s Ra’am party joined Israel’s government, helping sustain a coalition headed by Naftali Bennett. Arab political parties can help determine who governs the Jewish state.
That’s not a story for the Times.
Israel is routinely accused of being an “apartheid” state that excludes Arabs from political power. Yet Israeli Arabs, roughly one-fifth of the country’s population, exercise the same national voting rights as Jews, hold parliamentary seats and serve as judges. Rather than educate the public about the democracy in Israel, the Times wants its readers to continue to perceive of Israel in racist terms.
It is an antisemitic lens, and the far left continues to be conditioned to view Jews and the Jewish state through a deeply jaundiced perspective.
On October 23, 2026, gunmen opened fire on Christian mourners attending a funeral at St. George’s Greek Orthodox Church in Karak, Jordan. Nine people were killed and 40 wounded.
The interior of a Greek Orthodox church is seen through a shattered window hours after gunmen opened fire during a funeral, in Hamoud village, in Jordan’s Karak governorate, October 23, 2026. (AP Photo)
Jordanian authorities described the massacre as terrorism. Government spokesman Mohammad Momani attributed it to extremist takfiri ideology, associated with jihadist terrorist groups such as ISIS. The attackers’ identities and organizational affiliations remained unconfirmed.
Al Jazeera published three articles about the attack on October 23–24. It acknowledged that Jordanian authorities called the massacre terrorism, but did not explicitly describe the attackers as jihadists. Instead, its coverage repeatedly emphasized Jordan’s tradition of Muslim-Christian “coexistence,” including the possibility that the community would emerge even stronger.
And then Al Jazeera turned its attention to Israel. In its October 23 report, Al Jazeera introduced this claim:
“For years, King Abdullah has been a vocal critic of Israel’s systemic attacks against religious sites in occupied Palestinian territory.”
Israel had no reported connection to the massacre. Yet Al Jazeera found a way to bring Israel into the story.
Al Jazeera is funded by Qatar, which has hosted US-designated terrorist group Hamas leaders for years and provided billions of dollars in assistance to Hamas-governed Gaza. Qatar is also the largest reported foreign source of gifts and contracts to American universities, accounting for approximately $8.8 billion cumulatively, including more than $1.1 billion in 2025 alone.
Qatar pours billions into American universities, finances Al Jazeera and hosts Hamas leaders. Al Jazeera’s coverage whitewashes jihadi terrorism and redirects attention from Islamist extremism toward Israel. Another example of the insidious jihad killing Christians and Jews, being exported from the Middle East.
A child unwraps a chocolate bar, takes a bite, and discovers something delicious made in Israel. Show them “Product of Israel” on the wrapper. If it has Hebrew lettering, point that out too. It’s a happy way to make Israel familiar: a place where people make things we enjoy.
Put a small sign by the bowl: “Israeli-made treats – shared with pride.” Kids can take home a new favorite.
The Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) asks candidates it endorses to support the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) campaign against Israel. Anti-Israel positions are also gaining ground among some Democratic candidates and officials.
We are not interested and will have none of it.
Order an Israeli-made treat for your candy bowl, then share this post with friends, family, and neighborhood groups. Every order adds demand for Israeli producers; many bowls make that support visible across the neighborhood.
Let Israel be the place behind the treat they remember.
Two Israeli soldiers were killed by Palestinian terrorists near Hebron on Friday. Staff Sergeant Ron Yonatan Roytman, 23, and Sergeant Yuval Shai Svilem, 20, were killed, and three other soldiers wounded.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced a major operation in the Hebron neighborhood from which the attackers came. Soldiers would search homes, confiscate weapons and demolish terrorist infrastructure, repeating the model employed in Jenin and Tulkarm.
What exactly had Israel uncovered in those Palestinian cities?
In Jenin, Israeli soldiers reported discovering more than 100 explosive devices in just two days, along with a weapons-manufacturing workshop and a command center containing materials for making bombs. Explosives were even found hidden inside a washing machine.
In Tulkarm, soldiers found a weapons storage facility containing approximately 100 pipe bombs, eight additional explosive devices and equipment for detonating explosives. They discovered a drone-production laboratory and another bomb-making facility. Some 45 explosive devices had been planted beneath roads to attack Israeli soldiers and vehicles.
Across the broader northern West Bank operation, the Israeli military reported seizing more than 1,300 weapons and destroying over 50 terrorist infrastructure sites.
And how did the New York Times describe these discoveries?
Following Netanyahu’s announcement, the newspaper characterized Israel’s earlier operations in Jenin and Tulkarm as a massive crackdown, emphasizing that tens of thousands of Palestinians had been displaced, homes demolished and roads torn apart. It compared the destruction to Gaza, adding that the Israeli military said it was targeting militants.
The weapons factories, drone laboratories and explosives caches disappeared from its account when it was providing context to that specific account.
New York Times claims that Israeli military simply displaced people and ripped up roads without discussing the enormous weapons the IDF cleared out WHEN SPECIFICALLY GIVING CONTEXT TO THAT OPERATION
The Palestinian Authority’s official news agency, WAFA, offered an even more extraordinary account of Friday’s shooting. Its headline declared, “Preliminary reports of two Palestinians killed by Israeli gunfire in Hebron.”
The article described Israeli forces opening fire on “two young Palestinians,” causing them to fall to the ground. It omitted the two Israeli soldiers killed in the attack and the gunfire reportedly initiated by the Palestinians.
Two Palestinian gunmen who killed Israeli soldiers became two young Palestinians shot by Israeli forces.
According to Palestinian Authority media, Israelis shot and killed “two young Palestinians” without stating that they were armed and killed Israelis first
WAFA turned Palestinian gunmen who killed Israeli soldiers into victims of Israeli gunfire. The New York Times turned the dismantling of terrorist weapons factories into seemingly senseless destruction of Palestinian neighborhoods.
Different newspapers. The same distortion: remove the Palestinian terrorism, and Israel becomes the aggressor.
Gaza’s daily reported fatalities plunged by more than 90% following the October 2025 ceasefire, falling from over 90 per day during intense fighting in July to roughly four during much of 2026. Meanwhile, adult men’s share of newly identified fatalities climbed from 42% to over 63%, although they represented just 24.4% of Gaza’s population. Hamas combatants likely accounted for a substantial portion of those deaths. These extraordinary shifts tell a story buried beneath three years of cumulative death toll headlines.
For three years, Gaza’s death toll has dominated headlines. The number rises, newspapers report the latest milestone, politicians condemn Israel, and the world is reminded of the mounting casualties.
Yet the underlying data tell a story that has received remarkably little attention.
Gaza’s Ministry of Health under the direction of Hamas publishes detailed fatality figures, reproduced by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Those figures reveal dramatic changes in who was dying, how frequently deaths were being reported, and how the cumulative death toll was being assembled.
Together, they offer a very different perspective on the progression of Israel’s military campaign.
The Remarkable Shift Toward Adult Men
Before the war, children represented approximately 47% of Gaza’s population. Adult men ages 18–59 accounted for just 24.4%, adult women 23.9%, and the elderly 4.8%.
The composition of reported fatalities changed substantially as the war progressed.
Among deaths newly identified between April and October 2024, adult men accounted for 42%, children 34.4%, and adult women 14.1%. By July–October 2025, adult men’s share had risen to 59.5%, while children’s share had fallen to 25.1% and adult women’s share to just 9.9%.
Adult men were therefore accounting for nearly two and a half times their proportion of Gaza’s population, while women and children represented substantially smaller shares of fatalities than their respective population shares.
The pattern continued after the October 2025 ceasefire. Among 1,076 fatalities verified by the UN Human Rights Office through July 2026, 63.4% were men, 24.9% children and 11.7% women. The UN’s categories differ from the earlier Ministry of Health breakdown, but the disproportionate representation of men remains striking.
Hamas combatants are overwhelmingly adult men. The growing concentration of fatalities among this demographic is consistent with Israeli forces increasingly engaging combatants as they gained control of the battlefield and improved their ability to identify and target Hamas and other terrorist group’s positions.
From More Than 90 Deaths a Day to Fewer Than Five
The changes in the daily death toll are equally dramatic.
During the first eleven months of the war, Gaza reported an average of approximately 124 fatalities per day. Following the January 2025 ceasefire, the rate declined sharply before rising again when major military operations resumed in March.
During intense fighting in July 2025, the Ministry of Health reported more than 90 deaths per day. Following the October 2025 ceasefire, that figure collapsed. By September 16–23, 2026, just 24 fatalities were reported over seven days, an average of 3.4 per day. That represents a decline of more than 96% compared with the July 2025 reporting interval.
The numbers demonstrate how dramatically the intensity of military operations affected fatalities. They also reveal how misleading it can be to treat Gaza’s cumulative death toll as though it describes an unchanging level of violence.
The Death Toll Includes Deaths From Earlier Years
Another remarkable feature of Gaza’s reported death toll is how many fatalities are being added retrospectively.
Hamas’s Ministry of Health continues identifying bodies, reconciling records and approving deaths that occurred in earlier periods. Those deaths enter the cumulative total when they are registered, regardless of when or how they occurred. In several 2026 reporting periods, retrospective registrations accounted for the majority of additions to the published total.
Between September 16 and 23, for example, 24 fatalities were reported for the period while another 85 earlier deaths were added after their identification details were approved. Retrospective registrations therefore represented 78% of the combined increase.
That distinction is almost entirely lost when the media simply announces another increase in Gaza’s cumulative death toll.
What the Numbers Say About Israel’s Campaign
The world has spent three years judging Israel’s military campaign largely through a steadily increasing cumulative death toll. Yet the underlying statistics reveal a campaign whose reported fatality patterns changed dramatically.
As Israeli forces gained control of the battlefield, adult men accounted for an increasingly disproportionate share of identified fatalities. Women and children represented progressively smaller shares, well below their proportions of Gaza’s population.
These patterns are consistent with a military increasingly able to distinguish and target Hamas combatants. They challenge the portrayal of a campaign conducted without regard for the distinction between fighters and civilians.
Meanwhile, the reported daily death rate has collapsed, and much of the recent growth in the cumulative total during selected periods has come from deaths registered long after they occurred.
The accusation of indiscriminate slaughter collapses when looking into the data. The numbers have been available. The story they tell has largely gone unread.
Sources: Gaza Ministry of Health fatality figures published by UN OCHA; Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2023 population estimates; UN Human Rights Office verified-fatality reporting. Demographic identification cohorts and UN-verified post-ceasefire deaths use different methodologies and should not be interpreted as directly comparable measures of battlefield fatalities.
