Ninety-one years ago today, on November 20, 1935, British police killed Izz ad-Din al-Qassam in a gun battle near Jenin. His jihad began against European imperial powers. In Palestine, it also became a war against Jews seeking to rebuild their homeland.
Izz ad-din al-Qassam (1882-1935)
Al-Qassam was born in 1882 in Jableh, Syria, then part of the Ottoman Empire. He studied Islamic theology at al-Azhar in Cairo and became a militant preacher advocating jihad against foreign powers in Muslim lands.
When Italy invaded Libya in 1911, he raised money and recruited volunteers to fight the Italians. He later joined armed “resistance” against the French in Syria, earning a death sentence. In 1920, he fled to Haifa, two years before the League of Nations formally approved the British Mandate for Palestine.
Al-Qassam brought two causes to Palestine.
The first was expelling European powers from Arab and Muslim lands: Italy in Libya, France in Syria and now Britain in Palestine. Today, this would be called anti-colonialism.
The second was preventing Jews from reestablishing their national homeland.
Jews were not Italians in Libya or Frenchmen in Syria. Jews are an ancient, land-based people whose religion, identity and history are rooted in the Land of Israel. Jewish communities had lived there continuously for millennia, while generations in the diaspora prayed and yearned to return.
Jews at the Kotel, the Western Wall of the Jewish Temple Mount in the 1870s
One cause opposed foreign imperial rule. The other sought to deny Jews the very national rights he claimed for Arabs.
In Haifa, al-Qassam recruited followers and organized clandestine armed cells. By the early 1930s, he had established the Black Hand, a militant network that targeted Jewish communities and opposed British rule.
On November 7, 1935, Jewish police sergeant Moshe Rosenfeld was killed near Ein Harod in an attack attributed to al-Qassam’s armed group. Later that month, al-Qassam took his followers into the hills near Ya’bad to wage jihad.
British authorities pursued the group. Surrounded on November 20, al-Qassam reportedly refused surrender, declaring that he was fighting a holy war for God and the homeland. Al-Qassam and several followers were killed, along with a British policeman. Thousands attended his funeral. He became a celebrated martyr.
Five months later, on April 15, 1936, militants associated with al-Qassam’s movement attacked Jewish motorists near Tulkarm. Historical accounts describe the attackers invoking revenge for his death and seeking money for weapons. They shot three Jewish passengers, killing two.
The British killed al-Qassam. His followers killed Jews to avenge him.
The murders helped ignite the Arab Revolt of 1936–1939, during which Jews and British authorities were targeted in a sustained campaign of violence.
Hamas eventually named its military wing after al-Qassam. Palestinian Authority schools have borne his name supported by European funds, and activists in Sweden advertised a gathering honoring him as recently as November 2025.
The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (IQB) was founded in 1991 as the military wing of Hamas
Al-Qassam died before Israel existed. Before anyone called Judea and Samaria the “West Bank.” Before there was an Israeli occupation to oppose.
In 1948, Britain left Palestine and with it, the European imperial rule he had fought. But the other war did not end.
The colonial power departed nearly eight decades ago. The Arab war against Jewish sovereignty in their ancestral homeland continues.
On November 6, 2026, the Palestinian Authority’s official news agency, WAFA, condemned another alleged Israeli effort to “Judaize” the Tomb of the Patriarchs and Matriarchs in Hebron. The Palestinian Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs declared the site an “exclusively Islamic endowment” and called for international intervention to protect its Islamic character.
The tomb is the burial place of Abraham and Sarah, Isaac and Rebecca, and Jacob and Leah. The Palestinian Authority is accusing Jews of Judaizing the burial place of their own patriarchs and matriarchs.
The declaration came on the eve of Shabbat Chayei Sarah, when Jews around the world read Genesis 23, describing Abraham’s purchase of the Cave of Machpelah from Ephron the Hittite to bury Sarah. Abraham was subsequently buried there, followed by the other patriarchs and matriarchs. The site has been central to Jewish religious history for thousands of years, long before the emergence of Islam in the seventh century.
Muslims later culturally appropriated the site and instituted a regime of Islamic supremacy. Under centuries of Muslim rule, Jewish access to the tomb was restricted, eventually limiting Jews to praying outside the compound at the seventh step. In August 1929, Arab rioters massacred 67 Jews in Hebron, devastating the city’s ancient Jewish community. The killings and subsequent British evacuation nearly eliminated Jewish life in Hebron. Some survivors returned in 1931, only to be evacuated again in 1936. Jewish worship inside the Cave of Machpelah resumed following Israel’s capture of Hebron in 1967.
The contemporary campaign for exclusive Islamic control has been advanced by senior Palestinian officials. In August 2021, Mahmoud al-Habash, the Palestinian Authority’s Supreme Sharia Judge and religious adviser to President Mahmoud Abbas, declared “Israel and the Jews have no right – not historically and not religiously – to any centimeter of this purely Islamic mosque.“
In July 2026, al-Habash again declared that the site was a purely Islamic mosque and that non-Muslims had no rights there.
The Palestinian Ministry of Awqaf reinforced this position throughout 2026. It condemned Israeli construction work in the courtyard as an attempt to transform the compound into a synagogue, declared every courtyard and hall part of an exclusively Islamic endowment, and repeatedly characterized Jewish worship and religious administration as Judaization.
The Palestinian Authority’s campaign represents the continued Islamic appropriation of Jewish holy sites, denying Jewish religious rights while presenting Jewish prayer as an incursion. Through its religious ministry and official media, the PA promotes the Islamization of the Cave of Machpelah and the erasure of its Jewish identity, describing Jewish worship at the graves of Judaism’s founding families as an act of aggression.
The Palestinian Authority is so self-unaware that it has appealed to the “international and human rights institutions” to condemn Israel for violating Muslim rights at the Cave of the Jewish Matriarchs and Patriarchs. The world should use the opportunity to condemn this antisemitic denial of Jewish history and religious rights, rather than accept the outrageous claims of Palestinian officials.
Every November 2, the Palestinian Authority’s official news agency, WAFA, condemns the 1917 Balfour Declaration as Britain’s “colonial promise” of a Jewish homeland in another people’s land.
Modern media offer another version of the Promised Land story, portraying Jews in Judea and Samaria as religious extremists seeking to fulfill a divine promise and establish a “Greater Israel.” In September, Al Jazeera described young Jewish women in the West Bank as pursuing the “so-called Promised Land” through territorial expansion. The Wall Street Journal similarly reported on violent Jews who regarded the territory as their divine birthright, so needn’t follow man-made laws.
Jews are cast both as messianic lunatics and colonial tools.
For the Palestinian Authority, Britain replaces God as the source of the promise. Contemporary reporting instead portrays Jews in Judea and Samaria as seeking to seize by themselves territory promised by God. One story invokes colonialism, the other religious zealotry. Both portray Jews as outsiders seeking land granted by someone other than local Arabs.
The word promised suggests a benefactor, a recipient and something yet to be delivered. That framing obscures the fundamental relationship between Jews, Judaism and the Land of Israel.
Britain could endorse a political homeland, but it could neither create nor define the Jewish people’s relationship with the land. When the League of Nations incorporated the Balfour commitment of a national home for Jews into the Palestine Mandate in 1922, it expressly recognized the Jewish people’s historical connection to Palestine and the grounds for reconstituting such national home there.
Reconstituting, not inventing.
Yet even the Mandate’s recognition of a historical connection falls short. Many peoples have ancestral homelands. The Land of Israel is not simply where Jews once lived.
As explored in our earlier article, Judaism Is an Ancient Folk Religion, Jews are not merely followers of a universal faith like Christianity or Islam. They are a people whose religion developed around a particular land. That land is embedded in Jewish law, language, calendar, prayers and identity. Exile dispersed the people without removing the land from their religion.
Jewish house from the Second Temple period in Old City of Jerusalem, Israel (photo: First One Through)
Nor does Judaism divide the land according to modern political borders. Hebron, Bethlehem and Shiloh in Judea and Samaria are as integral to Jewish sacred geography as Jerusalem, Safed and Tiberias.
The biblical promise remains central to Jewish religious tradition, but it is not the source of Jewish peoplehood. A secular Jew can reject belief in God while remaining part of a people whose civilization is inseparable from the Land of Israel.
Palestinian Arabs portray Jewish attachment to the land as a product of British colonialism, while contemporary media often portray it as a religious zealotry to acquire territory. Both falsely turn something embedded in Jewish identity into something Jews are seeking to obtain.
The Land of Israel is neither past nor future for Jews but integral, outside of time. It was never a gift of Britain nor the United Nations but an eternal promise from God to Jews. The lies promoted by the Arab world that Judaism is not connected to the Land of Israel and that Jews are interlopers is not just antisemitic but turns the Jewish God into a European Lord, a further desecration of Judaism.
On October 27, 2026, Israel witnessed an extraordinary demonstration of democracy. Preliminary estimates put Israeli Arab voter turnout at approximately 80%, potentially exceeding that of Israeli Jews. Nearly a million Israeli Arabs may have voted, with Arab-led parties projected to win 17 to 18 seats in Israel’s 120-member Knesset. It was among the highest Arab turnouts in decades.
The New York Times chose a different story. Adam Rasgon’s headline declared: “Israeli elections have great consequences for Palestinians, but they don’t get to vote.”
On a day of remarkable Arab political participation, the Times focused on Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank who cannot vote in Israeli elections – who aren’t Israeli citizens. An achievement of Israeli democracy became another story of Israeli power and exclusion.
The last Palestinian parliamentary election took place in January 2006, when the US- designated foreign terrorist group Hamas defeated Fatah. The last presidential election was in January 2005, when Mahmoud Abbas, who wrote his doctoral thesis on Holocaust denial, won a four-year term that expired in 2009. He remains president today.
Hamas violently seized control of Gaza in 2007, while the Palestinian Authority continued governing parts of the West Bank. Neither has renewed its national electoral mandate. An entire generation of Palestinians has reached adulthood without electing its national leadership.
That’s not a story for the Times.
Meanwhile, Israeli Arabs regularly elect representatives to the Knesset, organize opposition parties and participate in governing coalitions. In 2021, Mansour Abbas’s Ra’am party joined Israel’s government, helping sustain a coalition headed by Naftali Bennett. Arab political parties can help determine who governs the Jewish state.
That’s not a story for the Times.
Israel is routinely accused of being an “apartheid” state that excludes Arabs from political power. Yet Israeli Arabs, roughly one-fifth of the country’s population, exercise the same national voting rights as Jews, hold parliamentary seats and serve as judges. Rather than educate the public about the democracy in Israel, the Times wants its readers to continue to perceive of Israel in racist terms.
It is an antisemitic lens, and the far left continues to be conditioned to view Jews and the Jewish state through a deeply jaundiced perspective.
An agency created to provide temporary relief now needs $70 million to cover its employees’ salaries over just two months. How did UNRWA become so large, expensive and financially dependent?
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) is appealing for another $70 million to cover a financial shortfall, with employee salaries for the final months of 2026 at risk.
It is a remarkable moment for an institution established in 1949 to address the immediate humanitarian needs of refugees from the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.
UNRWA began operations in 1950 with approximately 960,000 people on its registration rolls, distributing food, providing shelter and delivering basic medical assistance. Seventy-five years later, its register approaches six million people, its workforce numbers roughly 27,000, and its annual expenditure has exceeded $1 billion.
Along the way, it became an education system, a healthcare provider, a social-services agency and a major employer with retirement benefits serving people beyond its original refugee population.
The scale of this transformation deserves examination, particularly as UNRWA once again asks donors to finance obligations accumulated over decades.
What Changed in 75 Years?
Measure
Beginning
Later
Change
Registered population
960,021 (1950)
~5.9 million (2023)
6.1×
Employees
5,933 (1950)
27,756 (2022)
4.7×
Annual expenditure
$33.38 million (1950–51)
$1.31 billion (2022)
39.3× nominal
Schools
64 (1950)
706 (2023)
11.0×
Students
33,631 (1950)
543,075 (2023)
16.1×
Education share of regular spending
~1% (1950)
~60% (2002)
60-fold share
Relief share of regular spending
~97% (1950)
9.5% (2002)
Down 87.5 percentage points
Teachers
~800 (1950)
16,965 (2002)
~21×
Students per teacher
~51 (1950)
~29 (2002)
44% lower
Employer retirement contributions
—
$63.5 million (2024)
Recurring annual cost
Personnel expenditure
—
$735 million (2024)
57.7% of total spending
The comparisons use historical years for which measures are available. Expenditure growth is nominal; the initial expenditure figure covers 14 months, compared with 12 months for 2022.
UNRWA’s registered population grew approximately sixfold, while student enrollment expanded sixteenfold and its teaching workforce roughly 21-fold. The agency’s educational responsibilities grew far faster than its registered population, illustrating how profoundly its mission changed.
From Refugees to Generations of “Refugees”
UNRWA’s original registration population consisted primarily of people displaced by the 1948 war. Over subsequent decades, qualifying descendants became eligible for registration, creating a multigenerational population.
By 2023, nearly six million people were registered, including children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the original refugees and internally-displaced people. This increase reflects births, successive generations, migration and registration practices, rather than six million people personally displaced in 1948.
UNRWA also expanded eligibility beyond that original population. Following the 1967 war, the United Nations authorized the agency to assist additional displaced people, including individuals outside its registered refugee population.
By 1970, UNRWA was distributing approximately 217,000 monthly food rations to displaced people outside its refugee register, financed by the Jordanian government.
Registration also differs from actual service utilization. In 2023, approximately 2.02 million individuals used UNRWA healthcare services, compared with nearly six million registered “refugees.” Others used education, social services or emergency assistance, while some relied on alternative providers.
So even with the large budget, it doesn’t even cover all of the UNRWA registrants.
From Food Rations to Schools and Clinics
The greatest transformation occurred in what UNRWA actually did.
In 1950, approximately 97% of its regular programme spending went toward relief. Education accounted for roughly 1%.
By 1970, education had overtaken relief as the largest expenditure category. By 2002, education represented approximately 60% of regular programme expenditure, while relief had fallen to 9.5%.
UNRWA had become a substantial education system, with teachers, administrators, buildings, maintenance requirements and recurring operating expenses. Healthcare similarly evolved from emergency treatment into ongoing clinics, preventive medicine, maternal care and treatment of chronic illnesses.
Meanwhile, refugee camps themselves changed. The approximately 30,580 tents recorded in 1950 had largely disappeared by 1961, replaced by established residential communities and permanent structures.
UNRWA’s services increasingly resembled those normally provided by public institutions.
In 1983, UNRWA discontinued its general food-ration programme, shifting toward education, healthcare and targeted assistance. By its revised 1983 budget, education accounted for approximately 63% and relief for 10%. Emergency food distribution would return during subsequent conflicts, but the regular mission had fundamentally changed.
By 2022, however, relief and social services represented approximately 27.5% of total expenditures. This increase reflected a new generation of humanitarian crises, most having NOTHING to do with Israel.
The Syrian civil war beginning in 2011, Lebanon’s economic collapse beginning in 2019, and the COVID-19 pandemic beginning in 2020 created enormous additional demands for food assistance, emergency cash payments and support for displaced families. These crises, alongside continuing emergency assistance in Gaza and the West Bank, substantially expanded UNRWA’s relief operations.
The 2022 figures also include regular operations, emergency appeals and special projects, whereas the earlier historical budgets used different accounting categories. UNRWA spent approximately $387 million through emergency appeals in 2022. The larger relief share therefore reflects both newer crises and a broader accounting of expenditures, while education and healthcare remained its principal permanent services.
Graphic note: The 2022 “Other” category includes approximately 10% for administration and support, 5.7% for infrastructure and camp improvements, and roughly 1% for protection and microfinance. Earlier budget categories and reporting scopes differ from the 2022 total-expenditure presentation.
Emergency Spending That Became Permanent
The 1967 war illustrates how emergency responsibilities could become recurring expenses. For 1968, UNRWA proposed an ordinary budget of $40.2 million and an additional $5.7 million for expanded operations, representing 12.4% of the combined budget. Some emergency activities were incorporated into the ordinary program within a short period.
Subsequent conflicts, including the Gulf War, Second Intifada, Syrian civil war and successive Gaza wars, added further responsibilities. Temporary emergency responses developed into continuing facilities, services and employment obligations.
This institutional evolution creates a financial consequence: permanent services require permanent funding, even as UNRWA continues to operate under a refugee-relief 1949 mandate and depends heavily on voluntary donor contributions.
A Relief Agency Becomes a Major Employer
Education became UNRWA’s largest employer. By 2002, roughly three-quarters of its workforce worked in education.
Salaries and employee benefits consequently became central to its finances. In 2024, UNRWA reported approximately $735 million in personnel expenditure, representing 57.7% of its $1.27 billion total expenditure.
The agency also developed substantial retirement and employment obligations, financed through the contributions of governments and other international donors.
Most local employees participate in a Provident Fund, supported by employee and employer contributions. UNRWA’s employer contributions totaled approximately $63.5 million in 2024, money ultimately financed through its operating resources, principally donor contributions. Employees also contribute from their salaries. International employees generally participate in the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund, supported by employee and employer contributions.
Beyond retirement savings, UNRWA owes qualifying employees end-of-service and termination benefits. These obligations can require substantial payments when employees retire, leave or are laid off. Its audited accounts have recorded hundreds of millions of dollars in accrued employee-benefit liabilities, some of which lack dedicated funding reserves.
The United Nations’ 2025 strategic assessment estimated that mass termination of staff could generate approximately $278 million in indemnity payments, without available reserves to meet them. That figure is distinct from the broader accrued employee-benefit liabilities reported in UNRWA’s financial statements.
An organization created to provide emergency assistance has become a long-term employer whose workforce carries financial obligations extending well beyond any immediate humanitarian crisis.
What Should Happen After Another $70 Million?
UNRWA’s history raises questions that extend beyond the latest appeal.
How many of its nearly six million registered “refugees” actually depend on each service? What proportion of expenditure supports education, healthcare, emergency relief and administration? How much of its operating budget benefits people outside the original refugee registration system?
Could some established services be transferred to existing public institutions, and what would such a transition cost? How should employee retirement and termination obligations be financed? What would constitute a sustainable funding model for the services that remain?
These questions require answers grounded in audited expenditure, service usage, educational outcomes and the practical consequences of institutional change.
The United Nations itself has examined options ranging from predictable multiyear financing to changes in service delivery and transfers of responsibilities.
The $70 million appeal is a symptom of a much larger institutional problem. UNRWA has spent 75 years evolving from temporary relief into a billion-dollar-plus permanent education, healthcare and employment system, financed through international contributions. Another emergency payment may cover the next round of salaries. The harder question is whether the world intends to finance this structure indefinitely—or finally decide who should provide these services, under what mandate, and at what cost.
For decades, the world has been told that Palestinians live under conditions of extraordinary deprivation. Yet before October 7, 2023, several important demographic and social indicators told a very different story.
In 2022, the West Bank and Gaza had a fertility rate of approximately 3.4 children per woman. Among countries with fertility rates above three, the Palestinian territories also reported relatively high life expectancy, low infant mortality and exceptionally high adult literacy.
Uniquely among its Arab peers. Only Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (neither Arab) among high fertility countries, have quality of life statistics remotely close to Palestinian Arabs.
Palestinian Arab adult literacy was 98%. Infant mortality was far below that of many other high-fertility populations. Reported life expectancy was in the mid-70s, although estimates vary by source.
These were meaningful achievements, particularly in a region marked by conflict, poverty and political instability. They reflected billions of dollars of investment in education, extensive public health and educational services.
These incredible quality of life statistics came principally from the charity of western countries. The United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Norway, Ireland and other countries have provided extensive financial assistance to Palestinian Arabs, both directly and through international institutions such as UNRWA.
Yet these charitable countries face an entirely different demographic reality.
In 2022, fertility in Norway was approximately 1.4 children per woman. Ireland and Germany were around 1.5. Japan approximately 1.3, and the United States around 1.7. All were below the roughly 2.1 births per woman associated with long-term population replacement in low-mortality societies.
The Palestinian territories, meanwhile, averaged approximately 3.4.
So the countries financing Palestinian schools, hospitals and social services were experiencing declining birth rates and aging populations at home. And their taxpayers were helping support a population having roughly twice as many children per woman as their own societies.
And despite the western generosity and much better quality of life than surrounding Arabs, these same Palestinians decided to launch a genocidal war against Israel and destroy the world that Europeans and Americans financed.
Member of Gazan terrorist group during massacre of Israelis on October 7, 2023
The uncomfortable question for international donors is whether charity to a people who prioritize destroying their neighbor over building a society is logical. Or moral.
Norway, Ireland, Germany and Japan cannot purchase peace simply by financing another generation’s schools and hospitals.
A society’s children deserve more than the opportunity to survive infancy, learn to read and live long lives. They deserve leaders who will not gamble away those achievements in war, and an ideology that values coexistence with a Jewish State.
J Street calls itself “pro-Israel and pro-peace.” Apparently, that requires pretending Hamas has no agency nor role in the conflict.
In a Facebook post marking the anniversary of the Gaza ceasefire, J Street laments displaced Palestinians, continuing deaths, stalled reconstruction and the absence of a new Palestinian government. It then delivers its indictment:
“We cannot claim to stand for Israel’s future while looking away as its government denies Palestinians the possibility of one.”
Notice who is missing from this account of Gaza’s future: Hamas.
Hamas launched the October 7 massacre. Hamas continues to maintain an armed organization. Hamas has resisted surrendering its weapons and relinquishing military control. Yet in J Street’s telling, the obstacle to peace is Israel’s government.
Hamas becomes a passive spectator to its own war. Palestinians become people without political leadership or responsibility. Israel alone possesses agency, and therefore Israel alone receives blame.
J Street knows better. Its own policy analyses acknowledge Hamas’s continued armed presence and the necessity of disarmament. Yet when communicating with its Facebook audience, those inconvenient facts disappear.
J Street claims to be pro-Israel and pro-peace while treating Hamas as an innocent bystander and Israel as the sole villain. That is more than intellectual dishonesty. It is moral cowardice masquerading as moral clarity.
HISTORICAL ECHO
We have seen this in Jewish history before – those in leadership positions enabling the mob rather than confronting depravity.
In the wilderness, Aaron fashioned a Golden Calf rather than confront a crowd demanding an idol. Today, condemning Israel has become a new Golden Calf, an act of public devotion that substitutes fashionable outrage for moral judgment. J Street, which claims to speak for Jewish values and Israel’s future, should recognize the biblical warning. Instead, it leads and joins the worshippers, sacrificing moral clarity on the altar of popular approval.
Before the October 7, 2023 Gazan massacre of Israelis and the subsequent war in Gaza, Palestinian Arabs enjoyed one of the most favorable combinations of high fertility and low childhood mortality in the surrounding Arab world.
Typically, wealthy countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have few children and lower infant mortality, defined as a child dying before five years old. Poorer countries and those in conflict have more children and higher infant mortality, like Yemen, Iraq and Syria.
Yet in 2022, Palestinian women had approximately 3.6 children each, while the under-five mortality rate in the West Bank and Gaza was roughly 14 deaths per 1,000 live births.
Compare that with Syria, where approximately 21 children per 1,000 died before their fifth birthday. In Iraq, the figure was 23. In Yemen, 41. The difference was enormous. West Bank and Gaza Arabs were much closer to the exceptional high fertility and low infant mortality rates of Israel.
If one were to expand the regional focus to Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Djibouti, one would see an even more dramatic gap – Sudan (4.38; 51.7), Ethiopia (4.2; 46.5), Eritrea (3.79; 36.6) and Djibouti (2.7; 51.9). On the other extreme for wealthy Gulf states are UAE (1.15; 5.3) and Qatar (1.74; 6.1).
Applying Syria’s childhood mortality rate to approximately 144,000 Palestinian births in 2022 would imply roughly 950 additional deaths before age five. Iraq’s rate would imply another 1,300 deaths compared with the Palestinian rate. Yemen’s would imply nearly 3,900 additional deaths.
Extend those differences illustratively across 20 annual birth cohorts, assuming similar numbers of births and mortality differences, and the results are striking: approximately 19,000 additional Palestinian childhood survivors compared with Syria’s rate, 26,500 compared with Iraq’s, and 78,000 compared with Yemen’s. Using the same methodology for Sudan or Djibouti would result in nearly 110,000 Palestinian Arabs childhood deaths.
The Palestinian territories benefited from robust vaccination programs, maternal healthcare, hospitals, and medical services developed over decades, including services provided through United Nations and Palestinian institutions, international organizations, and cooperation with Israel.
Despite the incremental 19,000 to 110,000 young Palestinian Arabs alive today because of healthcare investment and coordination with Israel, anti-Israel organizations have been accusing Israel of pursuing a “genocide” and the destruction of the Palestinian population. These figures illustrate the precise opposite. Israel is a Palestinian Arab child MAKER.
The demographic record deserves to be confronted: Palestinian Arabs were raising large families, with child survival outcomes that compared extremely favorably with much of the neighboring Arab world.
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has once again postponed Palestinian elections, this time from November 2026 until September 2027. It is a familiar routine for the 90-year-old leader, who was elected in 2005 to a four-year term and has remained in power for 21 years. Palestinians last elected a legislature in 2006, when Hamas defeated Abbas’s Fatah party. Since then, Abbas has repeatedly promised elections, postponed them and continued governing by decree, knowing that he will be trounced in elections.
This latest postponement for the authoritarian leader has consequences far beyond Palestinian politics. In September 2025, Canada, France, Britain and Australia recognized a Palestinian state, citing commitments by Abbas to democratic elections and governance reform. Just over a year later, those promises have been broken.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney explicitly predicated recognition on Abbas’s commitment to fundamental governance reform, elections in 2026 excluding Hamas, and demilitarization. Australia’s Anthony Albanese similarly cited Palestinian commitments to elections, reform and demilitarization.
French President Emmanuel Macron secured written assurances from Abbas to hold presidential and legislative elections under international supervision. Britain’s Keir Starmer endorsed Abbas’s commitment to elections within a year of a ceasefire. Belgium tied further diplomatic implementation to elections and Hamas’s disarmament.
These Western governments knew Abbas’s record when they accepted his promises. He had already postponed national elections in 2021.
Meanwhile, only 32% of Palestinian Arabs are in favor of a two-state solution with a majority opposed according to an October 2026 Gallup poll. So what Palestinian state are western governments trying to recognize anyway?
The implications are straightforward. Western governments should announce that they are standing by their words and not going to recognize a Palestinian State headed by an authoritarian corrupt Holocaust denier, nor one with a genocidal jihadi legislature.
The Stateless Arabs from Palestine (SAPs) do not want a state to coexist next to a Jewish State; they want to control every inch of the holy land. Perhaps it is time for western governments to recognize what these regional Arabs have been saying consistently for a century.
Resilience is a word we use so casually that we sometimes forget what it actually means. It comes from the idea of springing back: absorbing a blow without allowing the blow to determine what comes next.
Israel received an extraordinary demonstration of it Wednesday morning.
Flydubai Flight FZ1073 was flying from Dubai to Tel Aviv carrying roughly 150 Israelis when something went terribly wrong in the cockpit. The plane plunged rapidly, eventually transmitted the international code for unlawful interference and diverted to Saudi Arabia. Israeli officials now say they are investigating the incident as an attempted terrorist attack. According to Israeli officials cited in press reports, a pilot was stabbed during the cockpit struggle, and passengers and crew helped overpower the attacker. Everyone aboard survived.
The investigation is continuing, and some details remain unsettled. But the response aboard the aircraft is striking. A plane full of people suddenly drops thousands of feet. There is violence in the cockpit. Passengers realize their lives may depend upon what happens in the next few minutes. People act and the attacker is subdued. The aircraft lands.
That is resilience in its most compressed form.
Inside the cockpit chaos: Passengers describe blood, screams on Flydubai flight
For a slower version, look at Kibbutz Be’eri.
On October 7, 2023 Be’eri suffered a horrific massacre at the hands of jihadists from Gaza. Nearly three years later, its residents are rebuilding houses, schools and community facilities and preparing for a broader return. Most of the community says it wants to return. The rebuilding effort describes its purpose in the simplest possible terms: returning home rather than allowing jihadi terror to decide whether the community continues to exist.
That is resilience too. Not forgetting or forgiving. Not pretending nothing happened nor escaping grief. Rebuilding anyway.
There is another way some societies and movements can process grievance, and it has almost the opposite dynamic.
A grievance can become something to preserve rather than overcome. Suffering becomes justification for retaliation. Retaliation produces a counterattack. The counterattack becomes a new grievance. That grievance then justifies another attack. Instead of absorbing catastrophe and trying to restore ordinary life, the political ideology continually replenishes itself from catastrophe.
There is a name for this process: grievance-fueled radicalization. Over the course of a century, it has become the mantra of Palestinian Arabs.
Palestinian Arabs mutilate Israelis in Ramallah and hold bloody hands aloft to cheering crowd at start of Second Intifada in October 2000
And it is impossible to understand Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad without understanding how powerfully this mechanism operates within their ideology.
Hamas’ foundational charter did not merely object to particular Israeli borders or governments. It presented Palestine as an Islamic waqf that could not be surrendered and described the struggle over the land in explicitly religious terms. It was a call to “cleanse” the land of Jews and “Crusaders.”
Palestinian Islamic Jihad is even less ambiguous. The U.S. State Department has described PIJ as committed to Israel’s destruction and the creation of an Islamic state throughout historic Palestine, including present-day Israel.
Hamas and PIJ bring back body of dead woman to cheering crowds in Gaza on October 7, 2023
The Palestinian jihadi movement built around grievance can interpret the consequences of its own violence as additional evidence for the grievance that justified the violence in the first place.
Hamas political bureau member Ghazi Hamad supplied an unusually stark example after October 7. He argued that Israel itself was responsible for the bloodshed, said Hamas would repeat October 7 again and again, and rejected the idea that Israel had a legitimate place on the land.
Consider the circularity. Israel’s existence is a grievance > Hamas attacks Israel is resistance > Israel response is a new grievance.
The cycle reproduces itself indefinitely because almost every possible outcome feeds it.
That is fundamentally the opposite of resilience.
Resilience does not require forgetting a grievance. Israelis certainly have not forgotten October 7, just as the people of Be’eri have not forgotten what happened in their homes. Resilience is the decision that suffering will not become the organizing principle of everything that follows.
The passengers on FZ1073 did not have the luxury of theorizing about any of this. Their aircraft was falling. They fought for control of it.
Be’eri has been doing essentially the same thing for three years, only much more slowly: taking back control of what comes next.
Israel has built resilience around what comes after catastrophe: survive, rebuild and move forward. Palestinian jihadist movements have built their cause around grievance that must be preserved, intensified and avenged. Coexistence becomes possible only when their stated mission to eliminate the Jewish state no longer governs the conflict.