Stephen Stills wrote those words sixty years ago for Buffalo Springfield’s For What It’s Worth. He did not tell listeners exactly what was happening. He told them to notice.
“Stop, hey, what’s that sound?”
For Jews today, it is becoming increasingly difficult not to hear it.
In Britain, years of anti-Israel demonstrations were followed by attacks on synagogues and Jewish institutions, the murder of two Jews at a Manchester synagogue on Yom Kippur and the stabbing of two visibly Jewish men in Golders Green.
Finally, Prime Minister Keir Starmer told Britain to “open their eyes to Jewish pain, Jewish suffering and Jewish fear.”
He was even more explicit about a slogan common at anti-Israel demonstrations: “If you stand alongside people who say globalise the intifada, you are calling for terrorism against Jews.”
“Everybody look what’s going down.”
Australia had its warnings too. Antisemitism surged after October 7. Jewish institutions were targeted. Then came Bondi Beach.
On December 14, 2025, gunmen opened fire on Jews celebrating Chanukah by the Sea. Fifteen victims were murdered. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese called it an “act of evil antisemitism.”
The warnings had become bodies.
The question is no longer whether every protester is an antisemite or every criticism of Israel antisemitic.
The question is whether something is happening here.
Britain’s leaders now say so. Australia’s leaders now say so.
American Jews should not need another massacre before believing their own eyes and ears.
America has already had Pittsburgh, where 11 Jews were murdered in synagogue; Poway, where a woman was murdered at Passover services; and Jersey City, where Jews were hunted inside a kosher market.
In 2025, two Israeli Embassy employees were murdered outside the Capital Jewish Museum in Washington, D.C. Days later, Jews demonstrating in Boulder, Colorado, for Israeli hostages were attacked with Molotov cocktails. Hostages were taken in a synagogue in Texas. An armed man rammed his truck into a Jewish school in Michigan.
The ADL recorded 6,274 antisemitic incidents in America in 2025—17 every day. Antisemitic assaults reached a record high.
Yet some institutions still debate the meaning of the sound.
In 2023, the presidents of Harvard, Penn and MIT were asked before Congress whether calling for the genocide of Jews violated their universities’ rules. Instead of an immediate yes came answers about context.
The Second Intifada meant suicide bombers on buses and in cafés and restaurants. It meant the deliberate murder of Jewish civilians. Now the slogan is shouted in America while American Jews are assaulted and Jewish institutions require armed guards.
Stephen Stills’s sixty-year-old warning suddenly sounds less like history. “There’s something happening here.”Now.
The university presidents wanted context. The mayor of the American city with the largest Jewish population wanted to explain intifada.
Jews have context. Pittsburgh is context. Poway is context. Jersey City is context. Boulder is context. Washington is context. Britain is context. Australia is context.
Stop. Hey. What’s that sound?Everybody look what’s going down.
Western governments have developed a familiar vocabulary.
“Hate is rising.”
“Religious intolerance is increasing.”
“Antisemitism and Islamophobia must be confronted.”
Every minority deserves protection. But treating victims equally does not require pretending they are being targeted equally.
Country
Anti-Jewish
Anti-Muslim
Jewish / Muslim Ratio
UK (England & Wales)
1,060 per 100,000
120 per 100,000
8.8×
Canada
~274 per 100,000
~13 per 100,000
~21×
United States
~250–300 per 100,000
~5–6 per 100,000
~45–50×
Australia*
~2,185 per 100,000
~38 per 100,000
~57×
*Australia uses community incident reporting rather than a directly comparable national police hate-crime database.
Britain clearly has a religious-hatred problem. Muslims and Jews suffer substantial levels of hate crime, well above that of other English-speaking countries, while Jews are targeted at almost nine times the rate of Muslims. Canada and USA show fewer hate crimes per population, and a wider disparity between Jews and Muslims being attacked.
Then there is Australia.
For the decade before October 7, 2023, Australia averaged 342 reported anti-Jewish incidents annually. That exploded to 2,062 in 2023/24 and remained at 1,654 in 2024/25. In New South Wales, police-recorded hate incidents against Jews rose from 40 in 2020 to 841 in 2025.
Then statistics became bodies.
On December 14, 2025, gunmen attacked Chanukah by the Sea at Bondi Beach. Fifteen people were murdered while celebrating the Jewish holiday.
Australia subsequently established a Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion, which is examining the circumstances surrounding the attack and whether authorities adequately recognized the threat to Jewish events.
Australia had been warned.
It had also begun responding. The government appointed Jewish communal leader Jillian Segal as Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism. Her national plan followed extensive consultation with Australian Jews, and the government adopted all 13 recommendations.
Yet Australia continues to struggle with whether antisemitism is a distinct threat or another part of generalized “hate.”
Its Combatting Antisemitism, Hate and Extremism Act puts antisemitism in the title – along with more generic terms of “hate” and “extremism.” There is nothing wrong with fighting all forms of hatred. The question is whether symmetry in government policy reflects the reality on the ground.
Australia’s available community data indicate roughly 38 anti-Muslim incidents per 100,000 Muslims and 2,185 anti-Jewish incidents per 100,000 Jews.
That is roughly 57-to-1.
Indeed, Australia’s Islamophobia envoy (in a federal post strictly devoted to “Islamophobia” and no other forms of hate) has urged the Royal Commission on Antisemitism to approach antisemitism through the broader causes of identity-based hatred and the common roots of antisemitism, Islamophobia and other prejudice.
“antisemitism, Islamophobia and other forms of prejudice share common causes, such as polarisation, online environments and declining trust in institutions. Tackling these underlying factors can strengthen outcomes for all communities.” – Australia’s Special Envoy to Combat Islamophobia, Aftab Malik, June 2026
What? If they were all the same, why are Jews attacked at a 57-to-1 ratio?
Australia does not have a generic hate problem that happens to include Jews. It has an extraordinary antisemitism problem that generic language about hate must not be allowed to hide.
On September 11, 2001, jihadi terrorists turned passenger airplanes into missiles and murdered nearly 3,000 Americans.
Only three days later, while bodies were still being recovered, ANSWER—Act Now to Stop War and End Racism—was formed to protest what America might do in response.
The name was important.
ANSWER viewed American military power abroad and racism at home as pieces of the same system: a wealthy, largely Western “Global North” dominating the poorer, disproportionately black and brown “Global South.”
For this anti-Western group, America was not defending itself. It was exercising imperial power. Those fighting it could be engaged in “resistance.”
Seven months after 9/11, Israel was pulled into the same framework.
On April 20, 2002, ANSWER organized more than 100,000 people in Washington under “Free Palestine, No War on Iraq.”
The Iraq War had not even begun.
Later that year, Medea Benjamin, Jodie Evans and others founded CODEPINK to oppose the coming Iraq War. The organizations forming around it had a broader worldview: America and its allies represented imperialism, while their opponents represented oppressed peoples fighting back.
Israel became another perfect target.
It was democratic, prosperous, militarily powerful and allied with America. It therefore became part of the “Global North.”
Never mind that roughly half of Israeli Jews have roots in the Middle East and North Africa. Never mind that Israel’s citizens include Arabs, Druze and other minorities. The supposedly racial framework somehow classified this remarkably diverse Middle Eastern country as the white colonialist.
That classification did something important.
It determined who was allowed to fight back.
Palestinian Arab jihadi violence could be “resistance.” Israeli force became “aggression.” ANSWER could call itself an antiwar organization while defending Palestinian attacks because it wasn’t really applying a rule against war. It was applying different rules to different sides.
Then came October 7, 2023. Thousands of Gazan terrorists invaded Israel, murdered roughly 1,200 people and kidnapped more than 250.
Israelis were still recovering bodies when ANSWER was mobilizing for “Free Palestine.”
The parallel with September 11 was remarkable. America gets attacked. Focus immediately turns to restraining America. Israel gets attacked. Focus immediately turns to restraining Israel.
Twenty-two years separated the attacks, but the ideological framework had barely moved.
The liberal societies being condemned have been spectacularly successful. People from every race, religion and continent continue trying to move to the United States, Canada, Europe and other liberal democracies. Israel itself absorbed Jews fleeing Europe, the Soviet Union, Ethiopia and the Arab and Muslim worlds.
People vote with their feet. They generally flee toward societies with elections, property rights, women’s equality, education, religious freedom and economic opportunity—not away from them.
The divide is not really white versus brown or North versus South. It is between those who view successful liberal societies as achievements worth defending and those who view their success and power as evidence of oppression.
September 11 exposed that divide in America. October 7 exposed it again in Israel.
The anti-Global North’s victims of preference changed from Afghanistan to Iraq to Palestine. And the vocabulary remained: imperialism, colonialism, oppression and resistance.
And so did the fundamental question: When terrorists attack a successful liberal society, who has the right to resist whom?
In Greek mythology, the Hydra was almost impossible to kill.
It had many heads. Cut one off and more grew in its place. Heracles eventually understood that killing the monster required more than endlessly chopping at whichever head was attacking him. Each severed neck had to be cauterized so it could not regenerate.
Heracles battling the Lernean Hydra
For nearly three years, Israel has been told that Hamas is a Hydra. Kill its leaders. Destroy its tunnels. Eliminate its fighters. It won’t matter. Hamas—or something worse—will simply grow back.
Queen Rania of Jordan articulated the underlying argument shortly after the October 7 massacre, that Israel’s actions against Hamas:
“create a new generation of resistance that is fiercer and more violent” – Queen Rania of Jordan
Retired U.S. Army Colonel Peter Mansoor was more explicit, predicting that “Hamas 2.0 will rise” from the destruction.
They identified a real danger. But regeneration is not immortality.
Hamas is more than leaders, tunnels, rockets and gunmen. It is a political and military organization built around an ideology. Destroy the organization while preserving everything capable of regenerating it and another head may indeed grow.
The question is whether everything capable of regenerating it must also be allowed to survive.
Nearly three years of Palestinian polling shows the problem.
As detailed recently in Palestinian Arabs Turn Inward, But Not Away From Hamas, Palestinian Arabs have dramatically lowered their expectations after three years of war. Support for Hamas and armed struggle has fallen sharply from the extraordinary levels recorded after October 7. But losing faith in Hamas’s ability to win is not the same thing as rejecting Hamas.
In the August 2026 PCPSR poll, 72% opposed Hamas disarming before a complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. Asked what Hamas would become if it gave up its weapons, 53% envisioned it remaining both armed and political and another 36% solely political. In all, 89% envisioned Hamas surviving in some form.
That is the Hydra problem.
And Hamas is only one head.
Hezbollah sits to Israel’s north. The Houthis attack from Yemen. Palestinian Islamic Jihad fights alongside Hamas. Above them, the Islamic Republic of Iran spent decades financing, arming and connecting organizations surrounding Israel.
October 7 exposed not simply a Hamas problem, but an ecosystem.
That is why eliminating Hamas militarily cannot be the entire definition of victory. As FirstOneThrough argued in From a Hamas Double Standard to the Hamas Dangerous Standard, an organization cannot maintain an independent army committed to destroying another state while simultaneously being normalized as an ordinary participant in democratic politics.
And military defeat addresses only part of what allows another head to grow.
FirstOneThrough addressed another part in The Only Way The Conflict Can End: the Palestinian claim to a so-called “right of return” into Israel itself.
A Palestinian state alongside Israel cannot simultaneously mean millions of Palestinians receive a state of their own while millions more retain a claim to move into Israel. That is 1.5 states for Arabs and 0.5 of a state for Jews.
American policy once said this plainly.
The 2004 Democratic Party platform called for Palestinian refugees to settle in a Palestinian state “rather than in Israel.” The 2008 platform repeated the position before the language was omitted in 2012.
President George W. Bush made the same commitment directly to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in April 2004 as Sharon prepared the Gaza disengagement. A realistic solution, Bush wrote, would involve establishing a Palestinian state and “the settling of Palestinian refugees there, rather than in Israel.”
The principle was straightforward: Palestinian statehood was supposed to resolve Palestinian statelessness, not provide another mechanism for eliminating the Jewish State.
Defeating the Hydra therefore requires ending not only Hamas’s ability to wage war, but the expectation that Israel is temporary.
History offers another model.
Nazi Germany did not fight alone, and victory did not consist of killing Hitler while leaving the Axis intact. Germany and its allies were defeated or surrendered.
Then came political defeat. The Nazi military and political apparatus was dismantled. The Nazi Party was outlawed. Its leaders were prosecuted. Germany was not invited to preserve a rebranded Nazi Party so its supporters could recover through elections what they had lost through war.
The Axis was defeated as a system.
The same principle should define the defeat of Hamas.
Hamas cannot be permitted to lose its army, change clothes and emerge as an internationally accepted political party. Global institutions and governments should treat Hamas as one organization, dismantle its financing and international infrastructure, and isolate organizations that materially finance or facilitate its terrorism.
Prohibition is only half the answer.
Muslim governments, religious leaders and international institutions should strengthen Muslim movements committed to peaceful coexistence, religious equality and acceptance of Jewish sovereignty. Muslim-majority countries that have made peace with Israel already demonstrate that Islam and permanent war against Jewish sovereignty are not synonymous. Isolate the jihadis in the Jihadi-Israel Conflict and empower the moderate Arab and Muslim countries.
Make the institutions of coexistence stronger while making the institutions of violent supremacy militarily, financially and politically untenable.
The Hydra has many heads.
Hamas is a head. Hezbollah is a head. The Houthis are a head. The Islamic Republic supplies the Hydra with blood. The ideology gives it reason to regenerate.
The Hamas 2.0 warning should therefore be taken seriously—but not accepted as prophecy.
The Hydra is difficult to kill. It is not immortal.
The name made sense at Israel’s founding. Israel fought wars against the armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and other Arab states. The conflict was understood principally as one between the Jewish State and the surrounding Arab world.
Then the map changed.
Egypt made peace with Israel in 1979. Jordan followed in 1994. During the horrific Second Intifada, the suicide bombings, shootings and other attacks were overwhelmingly part of a localized war involving Palestinian Arabs. The terminology narrowed accordingly. The Arab-Israeli Conflict increasingly became the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict.
That description is now inadequate too as the map evolved again over the past several years.
The Abraham Accords fundamentally changed the regional picture. The United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco normalized relations with Israel. Trade, tourism, investment and security cooperation followed. Other Muslim-majority countries have also maintained or developed relations with the Jewish State.
Yet at the same time, Israel has faced repeated war from Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and, increasingly directly, the Islamic Republic of Iran. These forces are separated by borders, ethnicity and even the Sunni-Shiite divide. What connects them is not Arab identity. It is a radical Islamist rejectionism that refuses to accept a sovereign Jewish state in the Middle East.
It is therefore time for the terminology to catch up. This is increasingly the Jihadi-Israel Conflict.
Ahlam Tamimi, who helped plan and transported the suicide bomber to the 2001 Sbarro restaurant bombing in Jerusalem and now lives in Jordan.
The term captures the venom, vitriol and violence of Hamas and the armed Islamist movements aligned against Israel. It encompasses Hezbollah and the Houthis and, most importantly, the Islamic Republic of Iran that has armed, financed and supported much of the network surrounding Israel.
It also leaves room to describe the roles of Qatar and Turkey, whose close relationships with Hamas and fierce political hostility toward Israel place them in a very different category from Muslim and Arab governments pursuing normalization.
Most importantly, the new terminology does something the old terminology cannot: it separates Muslims and Arabs who seek peace with Israel from radical Islamists committed to its destruction and the slaughter of Jews.
Hamas leader calling for slaughtering Jews as a religious Islamic principle
The dividing line has moved.
And that makes the choices facing Lebanon, Syria and Saudi Arabia especially important. They can move toward a Middle East built around trade and coexistence, or remain trapped in a conflict driven by radical Islamist movements that reject Jewish sovereignty, basic human rights and self-determination.
The conflict has become crystallized for what it likely always was: the Jihadi-Israel Conflict.
Two events separated by three months in 2021 delivered the same message to Islamist movements confronting more powerful enemies:
Keep fighting. Keep waiting. Eventually the infidels leave.
The first came in Israel.
In May 2021, Hamas launched rockets toward Jerusalem and Israeli cities, casting itself as the defender of Al-Aqsa and Palestinian Arab families facing possible eviction in Sheikh Jarrah.
Eleven days later came a ceasefire and the Israelis never moved forward with the evictions.
Immediately after the fight, the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research’s June 2021 poll described a “paradigm shift” toward Hamas and armed struggle. 77% of Palestinian Arabs believed Hamas had won, versus 1% who thought Israel had won. And 65% believed Hamas had achieved its declared objectives regarding Sheikh Jarrah and Al-Aqsa.
The perceived lesson was simple: Violence worked.
Then came Afghanistan a few months later.
On August 15, 2021, the Taliban returned to Kabul, twenty years after the United States had removed it from power. The lesson for jihadist movements was not that they needed to defeat a stronger enemy. They needed to outlast it.
As described at the time in Gaza, The Terrorist Enclave, Hamas met with the Taliban and congratulated it for expelling Western forces from Afghanistan.
By June 2023, Palestinian confidence had moved beyond believing Hamas could win a confrontation. PCPSR asked Palestinian Arabs whether Israel, then celebrating its 75th anniversary, would survive to celebrate its 100th. 66% said no. Only 27% believed Israel would still exist. Another 51% believed Palestinian Arabs would eventually recover historic Palestine and return refugees to their former villages and cities.
Just four months later came October 7.
Nearly three years of war have weakened that opinion – in the near-term. As FirstOneThrough detailed in Palestinian Arabs Turn Inward, But Not Away From Hamas, support for armed struggle has fallen sharply and only 20% of Palestinian Arabs now believe Hamas won the Gaza war but 89% believe Hamas will continue to exist in some capacity.
Weakened but waiting. “Resistance” with resolve.
Which brings the argument from the Taliban and Hamas to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Iran is making the same wager on time. That it can outlast the United States and send it packing much as the Taliban did in Afghanistan.
But for the United States, Iran is not Afghanistan.
Iran has called America the “Great Satan” since 1979 and built a regional military network directed against American forces and allies. Iran has developed increasingly long-range ballistic missiles and pursued nuclear weapons capabilities that could threaten far beyond its borders.
Afghanistan did neither.
Iran also sits on the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s petroleum consumption passes. Disruption there reaches energy markets and economies around the world.
Afghanistan had no comparable leverage over the global economy.
America had no long-term goals of staying in Afghanistan. It was not going to keep thousands of troops and pour billions of dollars in a region thousands of miles from its shores to make sure girls went to school and women had equal rights.
But Iran is a real concern for the entire western world, both militarily and economically.
The current U.S. war has already achieved important aims by severely degrading Iran’s nuclear, missile and proxy capabilities. But degraded is not finished.
Iran does not need to reverse its losses today. It only needs to survive long enough for politics to change.
And two elections are approaching. Israelis vote on October 27 and Americans vote in November 3.
For Iran, Hamas and the broader jihadist world, those are more than elections. They are milestones testing the strategy of patience.
While the strategic logic for Israel and U.S. to continue the fight may be sound, their citizens may vote differently. And that is what the jihadists are waiting to observe.
Israel cannot leave Israel. America cannot simply walk away from an Iran threatening its forces and allies, pursuing nuclear and long-range missile capabilities, and holding a critical artery of the global economy at risk.
But jihadist strategy places a different bet: Can they wait until Israelis and Americans vote to stop fighting?
The summer of 2021 taught Islamists that they don’t have to win the wars against more powerful foes. Iran has ten more weeks to stall negotiations and wait for democracies to decide whether to pursue long-term strategic benefits or move on to more immediate matters.
Democracies have elections. Their enemies know it.
Will Israelis and Americans turn their elections into the jihadists’ exit strategy.
The Economist warned this week that “Israel is flirting with the next intifada,” arguing that violent Jewish settlers may push West Bank Arabs into another uprising.
It has the intifada backwards.
West Bank Arabs do not need West Bank Jews to introduce them to political violence. Palestinian Arab attacks against Jews in Judea and Samaria have been a persistent feature of the conflict for years, even when nobody attached the formal label “intifada” to them.
By 2021 and 2022, new armed groups were emerging in Jenin and Nablus, including the Jenin Brigades, Nablus Brigades and Lions’ Den. Their attacks spread beyond Judea and Samaria into Israeli cities, while the Lions’ Den became popular among Palestinian Arabs and the Palestinian Authority resisted demands to suppress it.
That was the environment in which I wrote “The Settler Intifada” on July 2, 2023, three months before the October 7 massacre.
The argument was that something new was happening among Jews in Judea and Samaria.
For years, Palestinian Arabs had murdered Jews while Jewish residents generally relied upon the Israeli government and military for protection. That slowly began to change. “Price tag” attacks appeared, followed by much larger retaliatory attacks after Jews were murdered.
In February 2023, after two Jewish brothers were shot and killed while driving, hundreds of Jews descended on Huwara and burned cars and buildings. In June, after four Jews were murdered at a restaurant and gas station, hundreds went into Turmus Ayya and again burned property.
I wrote then that Jews in Judea and Samaria had become “exasperated and are starting to engage in massive revenge attacks.” I warned that as Palestinian Arab attacks continued, Jewish violence could “morph from retaliatory in nature to constant.”
That was the idea of a settler intifada.
The word intifada has become so closely associated with Palestinian Arabs that journalists instinctively use it only for Arab violence against Jews. The Arabic word means an uprising. Palestinian Arabs do not own it only when they perpetrate it.
If a population believes its government cannot protect it, loses faith in existing institutions and begins taking matters into its own hands through recurring political violence, that can fairly be described as an intifada whether the people carrying it out are Arabs or Jews.
And the October 7 massacre made the situation even more toxic.
Jews in Judea and Samaria saw their government’s incompetence in allowing the massacre to take place. From 2021 to 2023 they had seen how West Bank Arabs attacked them with impunity, and now they saw Israeli Jews get hunted in their homes by thousands of Gazans.
Close to home, Arabs celebrated the slaughter of Jews. In the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research’s December 2023 poll, 82% of West Bank respondents said Hamas was correct to launch the October 7 offensive. Support for Hamas surged after the attack, even more amongst West Bank Arabs than the Gazans who committed the crimes against humanity.
Jews in Judea and Samaria increasingly concluded that waiting for the Israeli government to stop Palestinian attacks was insufficient. Some began retaliating directly. Those attacks grew larger, more organized and less isolated.
But The Economist begins the movie in the middle. It sees Jewish violence today and warns that it may provoke a future Palestinian intifada. The more interesting story is that the Judea and Samara intifada is already underway.
AIPAC isn’t run by Israel. It is run by Americans who support Israel, just as Planned Parenthood is backed by pro abortion people, not aborted fetuses.
Israel isn’t committing genocide. It is preventing one by trying to eliminate Hamas, the genocidal jihadi group that invaded Israel, massacred civilians and seeks Israel’s destruction.
Israel isn’t an apartheid state. It is a multi-ethnic society in which Arabs are citizens, vote and serve throughout society. Meanwhile, Palestinian Arab leaders continue to demand a future Palestinian state devoid of Jews.
And then there is the claim about Americans losing their lives for Israel. Israel has overwhelmingly fought its own wars with its own soldiers. The American military presence inside Israel has historically been tiny compared with the enormous U.S. deployments around the world – about 110 people versus 175,000 around the world.
The money tells a similar story. The United States has spent roughly eight times as much supporting Ukraine in its war against Russia as Israel itself has spent fighting its eight-front war. Yet somehow Israel—not Ukraine, Europe or the dozens of countries where America stations troops—is presented as the foreign country consuming American lives and resources.
But there is something even more revealing about the Democrats.com post.
The entire thrust of the post was Pearson’s attack on Israel. Nothing about jobs. Nothing about housing, education, crime, taxes or the cost of living. Democrats.com chose his obsession with a foreign country as the reason Americans should see him as the future of their party.
And Democrats.com is not an obscure Facebook account.
Its founder and president, Bob Fertik, has spent more than two decades building a massive progressive Democratic communications network. Democrats.com says its network reaches more than 10 million supporters and boasts that “nearly every Democratic state party has rented our emails for nearly every competitive candidate since 2008.” It sells Democratic candidates access to its activists to raise money, recruit volunteers, mobilize supporters and turn out voters.
Fertik’s network has become part of the Democrats’ election-mobilization apparatus. So it matters what Fertik’s Democrats.com chooses to promote as the party’s future.
Pearson accused an American organization of being “the Israeli government’s lobbyist,” accused Israel of genocide and apartheid, and claimed Americans are losing their lives on behalf of Israel. Democrats.com took that anti-Israel statement, put it beneath his photograph and announced that this is the present and future of the Democratic Party.
So who exactly are the foreign-country fanatics?
Pearson is supposedly warning Americans that they are too consumed with the interests of a foreign country. Yet his showcased political message isn’t about Americans at all. It is about Israel. And Democrats.com apparently found that message so important that it used it to define both Pearson and the future of the party.
If Justin Pearson really is the “present and future” of the Democratic Party, the problem is much bigger than Justin Pearson.
Data centers have become one of America’s favorite environmental villains. Critics argue that they use too much land, consume too much water and strain the electric grid. Communities increasingly fight proposed facilities on environmental grounds.
The concerns over electricity are real. But put data centers alongside another ubiquitous American land use — golf courses — and the environmental picture looks very different.
Golf uses dramatically more land and direct water and requires harmful pesticides to maintain its turf. Data centers consume dramatically more electricity. And data centers produce roughly four times the overall economic impact already – before the upcoming artificial intelligence boom kicks in.
Metric
U.S. Data Centers
U.S. Golf Courses
Facilities / courses
~3,600 operational
16,034 courses at 13,975 facilities
Land
No authoritative national total; far below golf
~2.3 million acres
Direct water use
~17 billion gallons/year (2023)
~531 billion gallons/year (2024)
Electricity
176 TWh/year (2023)
~2.4 TWh/year*
Pesticides / herbicides
Not material
Regularly used on maintained turf
Total economic contribution / impact
$926.9 billion (2024)
$226.5 billion
Jobs supported
5.5 million
~1.65 million
*The national golf electricity estimate is older and should be treated as an order-of-magnitude comparison rather than a current industry census.
Start with volume. There is no universally accepted definition of a data center, so counts vary depending on whether campuses, buildings and individual facilities are counted separately. An August 2026 tracker identifies about 3,579 operational U.S. data centers and roughly 4,700 when facilities under construction and planned are included. Pew Research Center similarly reported in April that the country had more than 3,000 operational data centers. (DC Map) Golf is considerably more widespread. The latest National Golf Foundation figures count 16,034 courses at 13,975 facilities in the United States. (American Golf Industry Coalition)
Then there is land.
The USGA has estimated that American golf courses occupy nearly 2.3 million acres. (USGA) There is no similarly authoritative national accounting of the acreage occupied by data centers. Rather than manufacture precision from commercial databases, the relevant comparison is scale: America’s golf footprint runs into millions of acres, while several thousand data centers occupy a small fraction of that amount.
Water produces an even more startling comparison.
American golf facilities applied 1.63 million acre-feet of water in 2024, according to the latest Golf Course Environmental Profile survey. That equals approximately 531 billion gallons. To golf’s credit, that represents a 31% decline since 2005 as courses have closed and surviving facilities have become more efficient. (GCSAA)
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory estimated that U.S. data centers directly consumed approximately 66 billion liters of water in 2023, or roughly 17 billion gallons. (Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory) So American golf courses use roughly 31 times as much water as data centers directly consume onsite.
Data centers also have an indirect water footprint because generating electricity can consume substantial amounts of water. Golf similarly has indirect resource requirements associated with electricity, fertilizer, chemicals, equipment and maintenance. The 31-to-1 comparison is specifically between water applied at golf facilities and direct water consumed at data centers — not their respective total lifecycle water footprints.
Chemicals produce another imbalance, although one that cannot responsibly be reduced to a current national poundage figure.
Golf courses maintain enormous areas of highly managed turf using fungicides, herbicides, insecticides and other treatments. GCSAA’s national pest-management research confirms continued use of those conventional chemicals while also finding greater use of non-pesticide practices and reductions or little change in reliance on conventional chemistries between its major surveys. (GCSAA)
Data centers, by contrast, do not require herbicides, fungicides and insecticides as a significant part of their core operation. They may have ordinary landscaping needs, but chemicals are not to computing what turf treatment is to golf.
There is one environmental measure where the comparison flips completely: electricity.
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory estimated that U.S. data centers consumed 176 terawatt-hours of electricity in 2023, approximately 4.4% of total U.S. electricity consumption. Its June 2026 update projects that data centers could reach 11.8% of U.S. electricity consumption by 2030, with scenarios ranging from 9.5% to 15.3%. (Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory)
Golf isn’t remotely comparable. A U.S. Department of Energy analysis estimated golf-course electricity consumption at approximately 2.4 TWh annually, with a typical course consuming about 250,000 to 500,000 kWh and irrigation pumping accounting for 25% to 50% of course electricity use. The estimate is old, so it should not be mistaken for a current measurement. But even substantial growth would leave golf far below the electricity requirements of data centers. (U.S. Department of Energy)
Data centers are power infrastructure in a way golf courses simply are not. But power is being converted into something: economic output.
A 2026 PwC study commissioned by the Data Center Coalition calculated that the U.S. data-center industry contributed $926.9 billion to GDP in 2024, supported 5.5 million jobs and generated $204.4 billion in federal, state and local taxes. (Data Center Coalition)
Golf is also a significant American industry. Its national economic-impact study calculated $101.7 billion in direct economic activity and $226.5 billion when direct, indirect and induced effects are included, supporting nearly 1.65 million jobs and $80.1 billion of wage income. (GCSAA)
America has decided that using millions of acres and hundreds of billions of gallons of water for recreation is ordinary, while communities increasingly treat far smaller amounts of land and direct water used for digital infrastructure as an environmental crisis.
That doesn’t make data centers environmentally harmless. It identifies the environmental challenge they actually present: Power.
Data centers consumed 176 TWh in 2023 and could approach 12% of America’s electricity consumption by 2030. That growth demands generation, transmission and grid investment on an extraordinary scale.
The country should scrutinize where that electricity will come from, who pays for the infrastructure required to deliver it and whether utilities can add generation quickly enough without shifting costs onto existing customers.
Golf uses the land. Golf uses the water. Data centers use the power.
The question for data centers isn’t whether America can spare the acreage or the water. It is whether America can build the electricity infrastructure quickly enough to support an industry already contributing nearly $1 trillion to the economy and will drive the innovation and jobs of the future.
Israel is discussed with hyperbole and adjectives: massive settlements, enormous American aid, rampant settler violence, Jewish encroachment, disproportionate war.
Between 700,000 and 750,000 Palestinian Arabs became refugees when they fled the battlefield as they awaited fellow Muslim Arab armies to destroy the nascent Jewish State during the 1948-9 war. In the same era, roughly 850,000 Jews left or were expelled from Arab countries with many more leaving non-Arab Muslim countries like Iran and Afghanistan.
Even though the Jewish refugee population was larger, we never speak of it today.
Today, UNRWA registers 5.9 million Palestinian Arab refugees, predominantly consisting of descendants of the original refugees, and those who married or were adopted by refugees. The comparable number of registered Jewish refugees from Arab and Muslim countries and their descendants is zero.
The Jews were absorbed as citizens of Israel and other countries. Their children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren were not perpetuated as refugees, they way Palestinian Arabs have been forced by those same “brotherly” Arab countries which went to war with Israel in 1948-9, in order to perpetuate the war they initiated and lost.
650 Times — Arab League Territory to Israel
Israel covers roughly 22,000 square kilometers and the 22 members of the Arab League collectively cover roughly 13–14 million square kilometers.
The territory of the Arab League is approximately 650 times the size of Israel.
127 Times — Muslims to Jews
There are roughly 2 billion Muslims in the world, twice the size of the entire populations of North, Central and South America.
There are roughly 15.8 million Jews.
That is approximately 127 Muslims for every Jew.
Muslims account for roughly one-quarter of humanity. Jews account for about 0.2%.
Yet people in the West refer to Muslims as a “minority.”
60 to 1 — Muslims to Jews Ascending the Temple Mount
Before COVID, roughly 1.8 million to 2 million Muslims visited the Temple Mount annually, compared with approximately 30,000 Jewish visits in 2019. That is roughly 60 Muslim visits for every Jewish visit.
The more recent figures of 2025 after the October 7 massacre launched by Gazans has roughly halved the visits by Muslims and doubled those by Jews, lowering the figure to about 15 times at Judaism’s holiest site.
57 to 1 — OIC States to the Jewish State
There are 57 countries in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation that perpetually lambasts Israel. There is one Jewish state.
The Jewish state exists alongside a Muslim world dozens of times larger in countries, population and territory.
25 to 1 — American Defense Spending Outside Israel
Israel receives about $3.8 billion annually under the U.S.-Israel security assistance agreement. For every dollar America spends annually on Israel’s defense, roughly $25 is spent on defense elsewhere—defending the United States, maintaining forces abroad, supporting allies and providing security assistance around the world.
Even more striking, there are over 220,000 military personnel stationed around the world, of which slightly over 100 are in Israel. The baseline ratio is over 1,500-to-1, rising to 2,200-to-1 when reserve personnel are included.
The anti-Israel discussion focuses solely on Israel while ignoring the enormous American monies and personnel in Japan, Qatar, Germany and elsewhere.
14 Times — The Growth of Israel’s Arab Population
Approximately 156,000 Arabs lived in Israel in 1948 when the modern Jewish State was reestablished. Today, approximately 2.16 million Arabs live in Israel.
Israel’s Arab population has grown almost 14-fold since the establishment of the Jewish state. Meanwhile, the number of Jews inside Israel hasn’t even grown 12-times in that same time.
And people accuse Israel of “ethnic-cleansing.”
12 Times — Israeli Arabs Killed by Israeli Arabs Versus West Bank Arabs Killed by West Bank Jews
Thus far in 2026, Arab Israelis are murdered by other Arab Israelis at roughly 12 times the number of Palestinian Arabs killed by West Bank Jewish civilians in Judea and Samaria.
Hundreds of Arab Israelis have been murdered amid the organized-crime epidemic inside Israel over the last few years. Yet the international narrative solely focuses on settler violence.
10 to 1 — Muslim Gates to the Jewish Entrance
Muslims have access to the Jewish Temple Mount in the Old City of Jerusalem through ten gates. Jews and other non-Muslims enter through one: the Mughrabi Gate. There, Jews must pass through metal detectors and security clearance at only specified times of the day, even as Muslims ascend and descend at will through every other portal.
Muslim women descending from the Temple Mount through one of the many gates exclusively available for Muslims (photo: First One Through)
9 — Number of Times Hamas Charter Refers to Jews and Judaism
Hamas’s 1988 foundational charter is replete with antisemitic rhetoric. The opening lines begin with “Our struggle against the Jews…” and continues throughout its genocidal jihadist call to wipe out the Jewish people and Jewish State.
While the anti-Israel crowd pretends that the conflict is merely over land which can easily be compromised and carved up, they ignore the deep antisemitic ideology embedded in the Palestinian Arab culture.
8 Times — U.S.’s Ukraine War Spending Versus Gaza War Spending
The United States has spent roughly eight times more in connection with the Ukraine war with Russia than the Gaza war against Israel.
America has made roughly $195 billion available for Ukraine since Russia’s 2022 invasion. American expenditures associated with Israel and the Gaza war are a fraction of that amount.
Yet it is spending associated with Israel that is routinely presented as uniquely extraordinary.
6 to 0 — UN Bodies for Palestinians Versus Israelis
The United Nations maintains six standing bodies, offices or mechanisms focused specifically on Palestinian Arabs and Israel’s treatment of said Arabs: UNRWA; the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People; the Division for Palestinian Rights; the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices; the Special Rapporteur on the Palestinian territories; and the Human Rights Council’s permanent Agenda Item 7.
There is no comparable UN agency, committee or permanent agenda item devoted to protecting Israelis from the conflict, nor is there any group in the entire world (think the Kurds) so over-represented at the global organization.
5 — Gaza Wars Since Hamas Took Control
Israel withdrew every Jewish civilian and military asset from Gaza in 2005. Hamas subsequently took control of Gaza in 2007. Since then, it has launched five major rounds of war with Israel: in2008–09, 2012, 2014, 2021, 2023-.
Five wars in sixteen years.
2.5 to 1 — Israel Versus the Rest of the World at the UN
In 2024, the UN General Assembly adopted 18 resolutions focused on Israel. It adopted seven country-specific resolutions concerning the rest of the world combined.
That is roughly 2.5 to 1. One country received more than twice as many resolutions as every other country combined.
1 to 1 — An Equivalency of 15 Kilometers Which Matters for One But Not the Other
At its narrowest along the pre-1967 lines, Israel is roughly 15 kilometers wide. It is a stretch that continues along its major population centers.
After Ma’ale Adumim to Jerusalem’s east, the remaining West Bank corridor is also roughly 15 kilometers wide at a single narrow point where virtually no West Bank Arabs live.
15 kilometers versus 15 kilometers. Over a million Jews in the narrow stretch versus a few thousand Arabs.
Israel’s narrow waist is never described as dangerously vulnerable, while the West Bank neck is cast as making a two-state solution “impossible.”
1 — The Jewish State Whose Capital the World Challenges
There is only one country in the world whose national anthem is all about its capital.
Israel’s national anthem, Hatikvah, expresses the Jewish people’s ancient longing for Zion and Jerusalem.
The Knesset is there. The president is there. The prime minister is there. The Supreme Court is there. The government ministries are there.
Yet most countries still refuse to locate their embassies in Jerusalem or fully accept Israel’s designation of Jerusalem as its capital.
The numbers are there. Before accepting the narrative which is infused with anti-Israel bias, look at them.
First One Through 