A People of Many Lands With One Homeland

The Jewish people have spent much of their history outside the Land of Israel. They built extraordinary communities, raised generations of children, accumulated wealth and contributed to civilizations across the world. Some communities flourished for centuries. Others vanished.

Yet their homeland never changed.

This paradox appears in Vayetzei, at the beginning of the Jewish people’s formation.

Abraham secured a burial place in the Promised Land. Isaac reopened his father’s wells to sustain life there. But Jacob, whose twelve sons would become the tribes of Israel, built almost his entire family in Haran, far from the land promised to his fathers.

Eleven of his twelve sons were born there. Despite Laban’s deception and hostility, Jacob prospered, establishing a family and acquiring considerable wealth. Twenty years later, God commanded him to return.

Jacob was not returning because he had failed abroad. He was returning after succeeding.

The pattern continued in Egypt. Jacob’s extended family of seventy descended into Egypt, where their descendants multiplied into a nation numbering hundreds of thousands. Their greatest population growth occurred outside their homeland, yet their national journey led back to the land promised to their ancestors.

Centuries later, Jewish communities flourished in Babylon, Spain, Poland, Britain, America and countless other places. They created centers of learning, commerce and culture, often becoming deeply attached to their adopted countries.

But prosperity abroad never erased their connection to their ancestral homeland.

The diaspora was not simply an interruption of Jewish history. It was one of its great engines of growth, beginning with Jacob himself.

Hamas’s Hero Fought Two Wars. Only One Ended.

Ninety-one years ago today, on November 20, 1935, British police killed Izz ad-Din al-Qassam in a gun battle near Jenin. His jihad began against European imperial powers. In Palestine, it also became a war against Jews seeking to rebuild their homeland.

Izz ad-din al-Qassam (1882-1935)

Al-Qassam was born in 1882 in Jableh, Syria, then part of the Ottoman Empire. He studied Islamic theology at al-Azhar in Cairo and became a militant preacher advocating jihad against foreign powers in Muslim lands.

When Italy invaded Libya in 1911, he raised money and recruited volunteers to fight the Italians. He later joined armed “resistance” against the French in Syria, earning a death sentence. In 1920, he fled to Haifa, two years before the League of Nations formally approved the British Mandate for Palestine.

Al-Qassam brought two causes to Palestine.

The first was expelling European powers from Arab and Muslim lands: Italy in Libya, France in Syria and now Britain in Palestine. Today, this would be called anti-colonialism.

The second was preventing Jews from reestablishing their national homeland.

Jews were not Italians in Libya or Frenchmen in Syria. Jews are an ancient, land-based people whose religion, identity and history are rooted in the Land of Israel. Jewish communities had lived there continuously for millennia, while generations in the diaspora prayed and yearned to return.

Jews at the Kotel, the Western Wall of the Jewish Temple Mount in the 1870s

One cause opposed foreign imperial rule. The other sought to deny Jews the very national rights he claimed for Arabs.

In Haifa, al-Qassam recruited followers and organized clandestine armed cells. By the early 1930s, he had established the Black Hand, a militant network that targeted Jewish communities and opposed British rule.

On November 7, 1935, Jewish police sergeant Moshe Rosenfeld was killed near Ein Harod in an attack attributed to al-Qassam’s armed group. Later that month, al-Qassam took his followers into the hills near Ya’bad to wage jihad.

British authorities pursued the group. Surrounded on November 20, al-Qassam reportedly refused surrender, declaring that he was fighting a holy war for God and the homeland. Al-Qassam and several followers were killed, along with a British policeman. Thousands attended his funeral. He became a celebrated martyr.

Five months later, on April 15, 1936, militants associated with al-Qassam’s movement attacked Jewish motorists near Tulkarm. Historical accounts describe the attackers invoking revenge for his death and seeking money for weapons. They shot three Jewish passengers, killing two.

The British killed al-Qassam. His followers killed Jews to avenge him.

The murders helped ignite the Arab Revolt of 1936–1939, during which Jews and British authorities were targeted in a sustained campaign of violence.

Hamas eventually named its military wing after al-Qassam. Palestinian Authority schools have borne his name supported by European funds, and activists in Sweden advertised a gathering honoring him as recently as November 2025.

The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (IQB) was founded in 1991 as the military wing of Hamas

Al-Qassam died before Israel existed. Before anyone called Judea and Samaria the “West Bank.” Before there was an Israeli occupation to oppose.

In 1948, Britain left Palestine and with it, the European imperial rule he had fought. But the other war did not end.

The colonial power departed nearly eight decades ago. The Arab war against Jewish sovereignty in their ancestral homeland continues.

Will British Jewry Be Unrecognizable – Or Highly Recognizable – by 2040?

British Jews are increasingly questioning whether they have a future in Britain. Yet by 2040, Britain could have more Jews than it does today.

The apparent contradiction reflects a demographic transformation already underway. One segment of British Jewry is growing rapidly, while another has barely grown in two decades and is increasingly questioning whether to remain.

In 2001, Haredi Jews represented roughly one in eight Jews in England and Wales. By 2021, they accounted for nearly one in four. Today, they represent approximately 26% of Britain’s estimated 315,000 Jews (0.4% – 0.5% of the total UK population). The Haredi population nearly doubled in twenty years, while the rest of British Jewry remained virtually unchanged.

England and Wales20012021
Haredi Jews37,00073,000
Other Jews239,000237,000
Haredi share13%24%

The difference is largely explained by children. Haredi families commonly have five, six or more, and their communities are exceptionally young. Today, 60% of pupils attending British Jewish schools are in strictly Orthodox schools. Those children will become the next generation of parents, carrying forward a demographic expansion already embedded in the population.

While Haredi families are raising the next generation of British Jews, growing numbers of other British Jews are questioning whether to raise theirs in Britain at all.

Haredi Jews in the UK

A December 2025 survey by the Campaign Against Antisemitism found that 61% of respondents had considered leaving Britain because of antisemitism. Only 23% believed Jews had a long-term future in the country. The survey relied on self-selected respondents, but the depth of concern among those surveyed is difficult to dismiss.

Separate research by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research found that approximately 6% of British Jews surveyed in 2024 considered themselves highly likely to move permanently to Israel within five years. More recent JPR research found that younger Jews, Orthodox Jews and those most affected by antisemitism were particularly likely to consider aliyah.

And some are already leaving.

British aliyah to Israel has averaged roughly 550 people annually over the past two decades. In calendar 2025, 742 made aliyah, the highest annual total in more than forty years. During the Jewish year ending in 2026, Israeli authorities reported 975 immigrants from Britain, another forty-year high.

Those numbers represent a small percentage of the country’s Jews (0.3%) and a sustained exodus has not yet been established. Nevertheless, the latest figures suggest that growing emigration concerns may be beginning to translate into action.

Israel is only one destination. British Jews also have family, professional and communal ties to the United States, Canada, Australia and elsewhere. Those departures are harder to count because immigration records in those countries generally do not identify religion.

Nor would it take a mass departure to change British Jewry. A net decline of just 10% of today’s approximately 233,000 non-Haredi Jews over the next fourteen years would represent 23,300 people, equivalent to fewer than 1,700 annually. With historical Haredi growth continuing, that alone would raise the projected Haredi share in 2040 from approximately 36% to nearly 39%.

But the most intriguing twist comes from Israel itself.

For British Jews alarmed by antisemitism, Israel offers a Jewish homeland where they can build a future without depending on the tolerance of a non-Jewish majority. For some Haredi families, however, Israel presents a different calculation.

The Jewish state is struggling over compulsory military service for Haredi men. Israel’s Supreme Court has ruled against the continuation of broad exemptions without legal authorization, and the issue remains deeply contested politically. For British Haredi families opposed to conscription, uncertainty about whether their sons might face military obligations could discourage aliyah. The effect would depend on immigrant eligibility rules and future legislation; there is not yet evidence establishing that it is influencing British Haredi migration decisions.

English-speaking ultra-Orthodox rabbis hold an anti-conscription event in Ramat Beit Shemesh, December 22, 2025. (Sam Sokol/Times of Israel)

The irony is striking. Israel may increasingly attract British Jews who fear antisemitism, while its military conscription controversy could discourage some Haredi families from leaving Britain.

Meanwhile, established Haredi communities in UK’s Stamford Hill, Golders Green, Manchester and beyond provide the schools, synagogues and religious institutions needed to sustain large and growing families.

The result could be a growing divergence within British Jewry, with some Jews increasingly looking abroad while its fastest-growing segment has strong reasons to remain.

Qatar’s al Jazeera video on Haredi community in England ignoring COVID regulations

What would that mean by 2040?

The Institute for Jewish Policy Research has suggested that Haredim could approach one-third of British Jewry by 2040. My analysis suggests that the proportion could be higher, with 40% a plausible intermediate outcome rather than necessarily an upper boundary.

Starting with approximately 82,000 Haredi and 233,000 other Jews today, simply extending historical Haredi population growth of 3.5% annually, with no decline in the rest of British Jewry, produces a Haredi share of approximately 36% by 2040. A modest contraction in the non-Haredi population, combined with somewhat faster Haredi expansion, moves the share toward 40%. More pronounced changes could push it closer to 43%.

2040 scenarioHaredi JewsOther JewsHaredi share
Historical continuity133,000233,00036%
Moderate shift140,000220,00039%
Accelerated shift146,000197,00043%
These are illustrative scenarios, not probability-weighted forecasts. The historical case assumes 3.5% annual Haredi growth and a stable non-Haredi population. The moderate case assumes approximately 3.9% Haredi growth and 0.4% annual non-Haredi decline. The accelerated case assumes approximately 4.2% Haredi growth and 1.2% annual non-Haredi decline.

By 2040, Haredim could represent more than two in five British Jews, reshaping the country’s Jewish schools, synagogues, institutions and relationship with Israel.

The transformation requires no mass exodus. But it could accelerate if Jews questioning their future in Britain begin leaving, while Israeli conscription politics discourage some Haredi families from following.

Britain could have more Jews in 2040 than it has today. But the British Jewry behind those numbers may be profoundly different.


Sources

1. Institute for Jewish Policy Research — Historical British Jewish demographics

New Trends in the Study of Haredi Culture and Society, demographic analysis, Table 4. Documents Haredi and non-Haredi population estimates for England and Wales in 2001, 2011 and 2021.

2. Institute for Jewish Policy Research — Haredi population estimates

Dr. Daniel Staetsky, Haredi Jews around the world: Population trends and estimates, May 2022. Establishes the demographic characteristics and historical growth rates of Haredi populations.

3. Institute for Jewish Policy Research — Updated population estimates

JPR presentation, March 2026. Reports a UK core Jewish population of approximately 315,000, including 82,000 Haredi Jews, representing 26%.

4. Institute for Jewish Policy Research — Jewish school enrollment

Five interesting facts about Jewish schools in the UK. Reports that 60% of Jewish pupils attending Jewish schools are enrolled in strictly Orthodox schools.

5. Campaign Against Antisemitism — British Jewish attitudes

New polling: Majority of British Jews see no future in UK, December 21, 2025. Survey of 4,490 respondents, including questions about emigration, antisemitism and the future of Jewish life in Britain.

6. Institute for Jewish Policy Research — Emigration and aliyah

Dr. Jonathan Boyd, Time to leave the UK? Patterns of Jewish migration to Israel post-October 7, April 20, 2026. Examines annual aliyah figures, historical averages, emigration intentions and migration limitations.

7. Times of Israel — 2026 aliyah figures

Some 20,000 immigrated to Israel since last Rosh Hashanah as Western aliyah rises, September 2026. Reports 975 immigrants from Britain during the Jewish year.

8. Institute for Jewish Policy Research — 2040 British demographic outlook

Dr. Jonathan Boyd, One in seven of all Jews are strictly Orthodox; by 2040, it will be one in five, June 18, 2022. Discusses the expectation that Britain’s Haredi proportion could approach one-third by 2040.

9. Library of Congress — Israeli Haredi conscription

Israel: High Court Imposes Sanctions on Individual Haredi Men Avoiding Draft, July 1, 2026. Summarizes Israeli Supreme Court rulings and enforcement obligations.

10. Israel Democracy Institute — Conscription controversy

Conscription of Haredi Yeshiva Students to the IDF and the Emerging Constitutional Crisis, January 21, 2026. Explains the legal and political conflict surrounding Haredi military service.

11. FirstOneThrough — Independent 2040 demographic scenarios

Author’s calculations using the JPR March 2026 population estimates as the starting point, with compound annual population growth and decline assumptions over fourteen years. These scenarios are independent illustrations, not published JPR forecasts.

Europe’s Erasure of Jewish Jerusalem

Jews were already the majority of Jerusalem’s population since the 1860s, over half a century before the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate. Even within the Old City, roughly one-quarter of its recorded Ottoman subjects were Jewish in 1900. Their synagogues, schools, homes and religious institutions were woven into Jerusalem’s life long before the modern State of Israel.

Yet for the last two decades, the European Union has spent millions of euros preserving Jerusalem’s so-called “Palestinian heritage,” with no comparable funding identified for Jewish institutions in the Old City.

In 2013, the EU committed €2.4 million to restoring Islamic baths, a madrasa and other historic buildings. It later provided €4.23 million to rehabilitate a Franciscan-owned property for Palestinian housing and community use. In 2019, the EU awarded another €1.18 million to a project explicitly titled “Protecting Islamic and Christian Cultural Heritage in Jerusalem.”

No money has been spent on preserving Jewish heritage. By design.

In 1948, Jordanian forces captured the Jewish Quarter, expelled its Jewish residents and destroyed or desecrated its synagogues. For nineteen years, Jews were barred from entering the Old City. The Hurva Synagogue lay in ruins for decades.

A lone arch stood in the place of the destroyed Hurva Synagogue, until Israel rebuilt it with its own funds in 2010 (photo: First One Through in 1996)

Europe finances the preservation of Jerusalem’s Islamic and Christian heritage while offering no comparable support for the Jewish institutions that survived that destruction at the hands of Arabs.

The issue is not about Israel’s sovereignty. It is the Jewish people’s history, religion and connection to their holiest city.

The EU is not merely taking sides in a territorial dispute. By selectively funding non-Jewish Jerusalem’s heritage, it has become complicit in the erasure of Jews from the historical and cultural identity of their own holiest city.

The Grocery Bill Is Only a Problem When the Money Goes to Jews

Imagine Cenk Uygur filming his grocery-store commercial in Paris.

Man in a suit speaking into a microphone on a brightly lit stage

French families struggle to afford groceries. Violent riots have shaken major cities. Government debt is soaring, public services are strained, and officials insist there is no money for higher wages.

Yet France just committed another $5.5 million to build infrastructure for Palestinian Arabs in Judea and Samaria.

On November 17, as 146,000 demonstrators protested wages and deteriorating services, France pledged €5 million for Palestinian roads, electricity, water and other infrastructure in disputed territory. Just days earlier, Cenk Uygur blamed France’s riots on unaffordability, Israel and Zionists. He has said nothing about France sending money to Palestinian Arabs.

Of course, $5.5 million won’t rescue France’s finances. Neither would eliminating American aid to Israel make groceries affordable. But that never troubled Uygur’s argument.

The problem was never foreign aid. It was aid to Jews.

Screenshot of a post by Cenk Uygur stating, “If Jesus was born in Bethlehem today, he would be a Palestinian.”
Stupidity from the mouth of an antisemite. If my grandmother had wheels she’d be a wagon.

Will Another 100,000 Jews Leave France by 2040?

Antisemitism is driving French Jews to consider leaving. France’s political and economic future may determine how many actually go.

France has roughly 436,000 Jews. Nearly two-thirds have considered leaving.

That is the startling finding of a new American Jewish Committee study released in November 2026. Among 500 Jewish adults surveyed by IFOP, 64% reported having considered leaving France, up from 52% in 2024. Eighty-two percent reported experiencing antisemitism during their lifetimes. Nearly half have stopped wearing visible Jewish symbols, while 29% have removed the mezuzahs from their doors.

If Jean-Luc Mélenchon becomes president in 2027, 69% say they would consider leaving, including 40% who would certainly consider it. A Marine Le Pen presidency would prompt 31% to consider departure.

For centuries, France has been home to one of the world’s great Jewish communities. Today, many of its Jews are questioning whether their children should remain.

How many will leave by 2040? And will antisemitism alone determine the answer?

The Jews Who Have Already Left

French Jews have been leaving for decades, with Israel receiving the largest documented share.

Departures accelerated after the murder of Jewish schoolchildren in Toulouse in 2012 and the attacks culminating in the Hyper Cacher supermarket massacre in Paris in 2015.

Between 2014 and 2016, approximately 18,800 French Jews moved to Israel. The movement has accelerated again. By October 2026, Israeli authorities reported approximately 3,950 arrivals from France, already exceeding the roughly 3,400 recorded in all of 2025.

France is losing families raising the next generation and adults who might otherwise have spent their working lives in France.

Yet many who want to leave cannot. A doctor may need new qualifications to practice abroad. A business owner may be unable to sell a business. A family may depend on elderly parents. Some Jews who moved to Israel have returned because they could not rebuild their careers or afford the life they left behind.

Fear may start the conversation. Jobs, housing, family and finances often determine the decision.

What South Africa and Argentina Teach Us

South Africa once had a Jewish community exceeding 100,000. Today it numbers approximately 49,000.

Its Jews did not leave principally because of antisemitism. Political uncertainty, violence, crime and declining confidence in the country’s future persuaded many families that their children would have better opportunities elsewhere.

Argentina followed another path. Its Jewish community endured military dictatorship, hyperinflation and repeated economic crises. The financial collapse of 2001–2002 produced another wave of Jewish emigration.

Argentina’s Jews did not suddenly discover antisemitism in 2001. Their country was collapsing economically, and many who could leave did so.

France has already demonstrated how antisemitic violence can accelerate Jewish emigration. South Africa shows how political insecurity can sustain departures. Argentina shows how economic collapse can accelerate them.

France is neither South Africa nor Argentina. But their histories expose a danger that an exclusive focus on antisemitism misses.

The French Problem

The AJC survey offers a clue that its headlines have largely overlooked.

Twenty-six percent of French Jewish respondents cite concern about the future of Jews in France as their principal reason for considering departure. Another 22% cite concern about France’s future generally, while 8% cite economic reasons. Taken together, 30% of respondents identify France’s broader future or economic prospects as their principal concern, compared with 26% who specifically identify the future of Jews.

The survey also finds that 74% of French people are pessimistic about their country’s future, compared with 61% of French Jews. French Jews are not alone in questioning France’s direction. They are confronting those larger doubts while also facing antisemitism.

And France has reasons to worry.

The European Commission’s November 2026 forecast projects economic growth of just 0.4% this year and 0.6% in 2027. Unemployment is expected to climb from 8.4% in 2026 to 9.8% in 2028.

Government debt, already 115.7% of GDP in 2025, is projected to reach 123.2% by 2028. The budget deficit is forecast to remain above 5% of GDP through 2028. France is borrowing heavily while its economy barely grows. Its political divisions make serious fiscal reform increasingly difficult. Eventually, somebody must pay.

Higher taxes, reduced services and weaker economic opportunities could follow. For French Jews already questioning their future, these pressures would compound the antisemitism they face.

Antisemitism makes Jews question their safety. Political instability makes them question their rights. Economic deterioration makes them question their children’s future. Together, these pressures can turn the desire to leave into the decision to go.

Demographer Sergio DellaPergola has identified relative employment conditions as an important influence on aliyah. Economic opportunity can encourage migration alongside the desire to escape insecurity, provided opportunities abroad are attractive enough to make relocation practical.

How Many Will Leave?

Starting with France’s 436,000 Jews, I examined how emigration might unfold under three conditions: continued economic weakness, prolonged deterioration and a severe national crisis.

France need not experience an Argentine-style collapse to lose a substantial portion of its Jewish community.

France, 2026–2040LowMiddleHigh
AntisemitismPersistentWorseningWorsening
EconomyWeak but stableProlonged deteriorationSevere crisis
PoliticsInstitutions holdRepeated instabilityMajor loss of confidence
Illustrative gross departures~56,000~82,000~128,000
Equivalent share of today’s Jewish population13%19%29%

The low case assumes that elevated migration gradually subsides toward 0.9% annually. The middle case includes several years approaching 1.8%. The high case requires a much more serious crisis, with rates approaching 3.8% for a limited period.

These are illustrative scenarios based on historical migration experience, not statistical forecasts or predictions of a French economic collapse. They represent gross departures, not permanent population losses. Some emigrants will return, while births, deaths and immigration into France will also affect the population.

Under the middle case, cumulative departures would equal roughly one-fifth of today’s French Jewish population. Under the high case, nearly three in ten.

When Jewish families leave France, the loss extends beyond those boarding the plane. Their children may grow up elsewhere, establish families elsewhere and build the Jewish communities of other countries rather than France.

The future of French Jewry will be shaped not only by those who leave, but by the generations who will never be born or raised in France because their parents chose to build their lives elsewhere.

France’s Choice

The AJC report calls on France to confront antisemitism and restore the confidence of its Jewish citizens. But protecting Jews from antisemitism may not be enough to keep them in France.

France could strengthen security around synagogues, prosecute antisemites and protect Jewish rights, yet still lose tens of thousands of Jews to countries whose futures they trust more.

The AJC report asks France to protect its Jews. This analysis suggests that France must also protect itself.


Sources and Methodology

Antisemitism, emigration intentions and political attitudes

Jewish population and migration

French economic outlook

Forecast methodology

The analysis begins with approximately 436,000 Jews in France and applies three illustrative annual emigration-rate paths from 2026 through 2040.

YearLowMiddleHigh
20261.2%1.2%1.2%
20270.9%1.2%1.5%
20280.9%1.3%2.0%
20290.9%1.5%2.7%
20300.9%1.7%3.5%
20310.9%1.8%3.8%
20320.9%1.8%3.6%
20330.9%1.6%3.0%
20340.9%1.5%2.6%
20350.9%1.4%2.3%
20360.9%1.3%2.0%
20370.9%1.2%1.8%
20380.9%1.1%1.6%
20390.9%1.1%1.4%
20400.9%1.0%1.2%
The rates are illustrative assumptions informed by historical migration experience, not statistically fitted estimates. No probabilities are assigned to the scenarios. The model excludes births, deaths, return migration and immigration into France and therefore does not predict the Jewish population remaining in 2040.

Too Small to Matter, Too Costly to Defend

“Too big to fail” entered our vocabulary when governments rescued banks whose collapse threatened the global economy. General Motors and Chrysler were bailed out because too many jobs and communities depended on them. Jensen Huang, Nvidia’s CEO, may be too critical to permanently dismiss, given his central role in the AI revolution.

Size and importance confer protection. When the cost of losing something exceeds the cost of saving it, society finds a way to protect it.

But what happens when the calculation runs in reverse?

There are fewer than 16 million Jews worldwide, less than 0.2% of humanity. Even before the Holocaust, there were only about 16.5 million. Israel, the world’s only Jewish state, is smaller than New Jersey.

Jews may simply be too small to matter.

Consider the calculation facing a politician, university president, corporate executive, or international institution. Defending Jews may win the appreciation of a tiny minority. Remaining silent may cost nothing. Attacking Israel may even bring political rewards.

And consider the other side of the calculation.

There are roughly two billion Muslims worldwide, alongside insanely wealthy governments, powerful international organizations, and activist movements hostile to Israel. Even a small fraction of this much larger population can exert substantial political and financial pressure. Qatar alone has invested enormous resources in universities, media, sports, and international influence.

For politicians and institutions calculating rewards and consequences, defending Jews can become a liability. Abandoning them can be the easier choice.

And Jews face a peculiar contradiction. Despite their tiny numbers, antisemitic conspiracy theories portray them as controlling governments, banks, media, and world events. Israel, a small country, is depicted as an outsized threat to international peace.

Jews are simultaneously too small to command protection and supposedly too powerful to deserve it. Their actual vulnerability makes them easy to abandon. Their imagined power makes them easy to attack.

An ancient people who survived empires, exile, persecution, and the Holocaust are still being judged by whether defending them is worth the political cost. On a purely selfish basis, abandoning Jews may be the rational choice.

But morality is not arithmetic.

A society that protects only those powerful enough to demand protection is not defending rights. It is accommodating power.

Jews seek no special protection. They are entitled to equal protection, even when providing it is politically costly. This is where the treatment of Jews becomes a test of something much larger than antisemitism.

Majority rule is democracy’s mechanism, and minority rights are among the essential safeguards of a liberal democratic republic. Without those safeguards, elections can become little more than a means for the powerful to impose their will on the powerless.

Jews lack the numbers to guarantee their own protection through the ballot box. Their security depends on a society’s willingness to uphold principles that transcend political advantage. And if those principles can be discarded when Jews become inconvenient, they can be discarded for any minority.

George Washington’s letter to the synagogue in Newport, RI in 1790

The banks were too big to fail. The automobile companies were too important to lose. Jews may be too small to matter in the calculations of political power. Yet their treatment represents a moral threshold for every society claiming to embrace liberal values.

The truest test of a democratic republic is not how it serves the majority, but whether it protects the rights of those too few to protect themselves.

Protecting Muslims or Protecting Islam?

From the United Nations to New Jersey

In 1999, Muslim-majority countries launched a campaign at the United Nations to protect Islam from criticism. Led by Pakistan on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Conference, now the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), they sought international condemnation of the defamation of religion, particularly Islam.

Governments already prohibited religious discrimination and violence. The OIC wanted to go further, establishing protections for religious beliefs themselves against disparagement.

In 2005, a Danish newspaper published twelve cartoons of Muhammad, including one depicting the Islamic prophet with a bomb in his turban. Protests erupted across the Muslim world. Embassies were attacked, hundred of people were killed, and cartoonists received death threats.

The cartoons had not denied Muslims jobs, housing or religious freedom. They had insulted Islam. That was precisely the offense the OIC wanted governments to address.

The campaign had intensified after September 11, 2001, as Muslim governments sought to prevent Islam from being associated with terrorism. In 2007, the UN Human Rights Council included respect for religions among the considerations for restricting freedom of expression.

But the effort eventually met resistance. In 2011, the Human Rights Council shifted its emphasis away from defamation of religions toward protecting individuals from religious discrimination and violence. The UN Human Rights Committee subsequently reaffirmed that blasphemy prohibitions were generally incompatible with freedom of expression.

People have rights. Religions do not have a right to be free from criticism.

Yet the world contorted to the sensitivities of two billion Muslims. Consider that it has become standard policy of many institutions in the west – such as universities and mainstream media – to not show pictures of the Islamic prophet to protect the sensitivities of some religious Muslims.

In an ten-year anniversary story ABOUT THE DANISH CARTOONS, PBS made a disclaimer at beginning of the story that it was not going to show the cartoons: “In an editor’s note: we will not air the cartoons. It is our policy to not show images of the prophet Mohammed because doing so is offensive to some viewers.”

Twenty-seven years after the OIC launched its campaign, New Jersey is considering legislation that threatens to blur that boundary about speech against an ideology and discrimination against people.

Assemblyman Joe Danielsen introduced Assembly Bill A1146 for the 2026 legislative session, establishing a definition of Islamophobia for use in discrimination investigations.

Much of the legislation addresses genuine prejudice against Muslims, including conspiracy theories about Muslim control of government, accusations of divided loyalty, and assertions that Muslims have a unique propensity for terrorism. But the definition also includes: “hostility and fear of Islam, and as a result, a fear of and aversion to all Muslims or the majority of Muslims.”

Islam is a religion. Muslims are people. They are not interchangeable.

A Jew can fear Islamic teachings that call for the murder of Jews without hating all Muslims. A Hindu can condemn Islamic persecution of Hindus. A former Muslim can denounce apostasy laws. A woman can oppose Islamic restrictions on women. A cartoonist can draw Muhammad. None should have to demonstrate affection for Islam to establish that they harbor no prejudice against Muslims.

Turkey arrests cartoonists who depicted Islamic prophet in 2025. The “insult” reached the highest levels of government

New Jersey directs public officials and law enforcement officers to consider its definition when investigating alleged discrimination. A university professor who criticizes Islamic law and subsequently faces a discrimination complaint from a Muslim student could find his statements examined as evidence of prejudice.

The bill does not completely outlaw criticism of Islam. It expressly preserves First Amendment protections, and its definition requires fear of Islam to result in aversion toward Muslims. But it invites government investigators to consider criticism of a religion when determining whether someone is prejudiced against its followers.

What the OIC could not secure at the United Nations may now find its way into American law.

One of the gunmen who killed people in Paris in 2015 during the Charlie Hebdo attacks became radicalized from the 2005 Danish cartoons incident and tried to join al Qaeda

The legislation contains another revealing contradiction.

New Jersey’s definition borrows heavily from the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism. Both address conspiracy theories, divided loyalty and prejudice against religious minorities. The IHRA definition explicitly protects criticism of Israel comparable to criticism of any other country, and New Jersey’s bill similarly protects criticism of Muslim-majority countries.

Yet it offers no comparable protection for criticism of religion itself. This omission is especially striking given the position of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). CAIR-New Jersey supported earlier versions of the Islamophobia legislation while opposing New Jersey’s proposed adoption of the IHRA definition of antisemitism.

Sunni Action Committee protestors in Pakistan, February 2008 (photo: Athar Hussein, Reuters)

The legislation’s sponsors have described their proposal as the nation’s first state definition of Islamophobia. If adopted, it could become a model for other states. That would be problematic.

New Jersey can protect Muslims without protecting Islam from criticism. Strike the reference to hostility and fear of Islam. Define Islamophobia as prejudice against Muslims. Explicitly protect criticism of Islamic teachings, religious figures and practices, just as the legislation protects criticism of Muslim-majority countries.

Christians cannot demand that government protect Jesus from ridicule. Jews cannot demand that government prohibit criticism of the Torah. Muslims cannot demand that government shield Muhammad or the Quran from scrutiny.

The OIC sought international recognition that insulting Islam was an offense requiring government intervention. New Jersey proposes something different, but potentially just as troubling: allowing criticism of Islam to become evidence of prejudice against Muslims.

Muslims deserve protection from discrimination just like every one else. Islam does not deserve protection from criticism just like every other faith.

Tikvah’s Intellectual Feast in an Age of Junk Food

I always look forward to Tikvah’s annual Jewish Leadership Conference. This year, some 1,100 people packed a New York City venue to hear Ruth Wisse, Dara Horn, Micah Goodman and an extraordinary collection of Jewish thinkers and political leaders.

Dara Horn addressing the audience at Tikvah’s Jewish Leadership Conference on November 15, 2026 (photo: First One Through)

Several speakers noted that the conference invitation had listed the location as “TBD,” as Jewish gatherings increasingly conceal their venues until shortly before the event for security reasons. What once would have seemed extraordinary has become routine.

Yet the atmosphere was uplifting. There was warmth in seeing familiar faces and being surrounded by people who shared a deep concern for the Jewish people and the direction of American society.

The conference itself has evolved since it was founded in 2017. In earlier years, Tikvah offered breakout sessions, allowing attendees to choose among competing speakers and subjects. The unified program eliminates the logistical challenges and frustration of missing other sessions. But it also reflects something deeper.

People come for the intellectual content, but increasingly for chizuk, the strength that comes from being among fellow travelers. They want to bond with people who understand their concerns and share their distress at what is happening around them. The gathering has become as much about strengthening a community as expanding its knowledge.

The format also gives Tikvah a larger platform to showcase its growing ambitions. For years, the organization has emphasized the Judeo-Christian foundations of American civilization. This year’s preceding weekend programming, and the presence of numerous Christian pastors, demonstrated how central that mission has become.

Tikvah recognizes that Jews alone cannot preserve America’s Judeo-Christian inheritance. Its growing partnership with the vastly larger Christian community reflects an ambition extending well beyond Jewish education to the renewal of American civilization.

The organization announced expanding initiatives to train teachers and leaders of Jewish day schools, develop educational materials and bring stronger curricula into America’s struggling public schools. These are substantial and worthwhile undertakings, aimed at raising young adults with the knowledge, confidence and moral grounding to withstand the pressures of contemporary society.

Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) comments were particularly striking. Since the Obama administration, Cruz has warned about growing hostility toward Israel and Jews on the political left. Now he spoke with dismay about the antisemitism within his own Republican Party, calling out several right-wing bigots whom he said must be expelled and expunged completely and permanently.

The conference did not avoid the uncomfortable realities of contemporary America. Yet as the day progressed, I became increasingly uneasy about the prescriptions.

Education. Facts. History. Better storytelling.

Rabbi Meir Soloveichik concluded the day with an appeal for the power of stories. It was a fitting message for a gathering devoted to Jewish civilization. For thousands of years, Jews have preserved their identity through books, teachers, arguments and stories. Tikvah excels at all of them.

But where was the discussion about engagement for those less hungry for the richness of culture, history and honest debate?

In 2022, I bemoaned that We Listen to Idiots. I explored the growing disconnect between intellectual authority and popular influence. We fight with facts, they fight with feelings. We build logic, they build engagement. We look for truth, they look for traction.

As I observed then, “America has replaced “In God We Trust” with “In Influencers We Trust.”” It was an extension of the 2016 observation, “In a world where facts are extraneous, we are only left with a clash of emotions.” Society is running for the quick emotional adrenaline pushed by their favorite stars.

Tikvah had assembled some of the finest Jewish minds in America. But millions of Americans under 35 are getting their understanding of Jews, Israel, America, politics and history from influencers whose principal qualification is their ability to attract attention.

The People of the Book are trying to win an argument in a world that increasingly refuses to read.

Rabbi Meir Soloveichik addressing the audience at Tikvah’s Jewish Leadership Conference on November 15, 2026 (photo: First One Through)

For decades, parents have worried about what their children eat. We understand the dangers of excessive sugar, trans fats and processed junk food. Yet we allow young people to spend hours every day consuming intellectual junk food.

Algorithms reward outrage. Influencers compete through provocation. Foreign propagandists and bot networks exploit platforms whose business models reward attention, regardless of whether the content is truthful or poisonous.

Young people are fed a continuous diet of anger, resentment and ideological certainty. Their attention spans, patience and willingness to consider competing arguments are being shaped by the same machinery.

And our response is to improve the curriculum. Tikvah is improving the quality of the meal while the younger generation is consuming poison throughout the day.

There is an urgent battle to be fought at local school boards over curricula and educational priorities, and nationally over foreign funding and influence in American education. The social media platforms themselves must also be confronted. Foreign manipulation and coordinated bot networks need to be exposed and disrupted, while the algorithms that amplify hatred and conspiracy deserve the same serious scrutiny we apply to harmful ingredients in our children’s food.

But protecting young people from intellectual junk food is only part of the challenge. We must also compete for their attention.

Yes, we need Ruth Wisse and Andrew Roberts. We need Micah Goodman, master educators, rabbis and pastors. But we also need the cultural reach of a Sydney Sweeney.

The people shaping the next generation are not necessarily the people with the greatest knowledge. They are the people who command its attention.

Tikvah’s educational programs will take years to mature. Will they reach enough young people? Will its Christian alliances achieve sufficient scale? Will either move quickly enough to counter the cultural forces already shaping an entire generation?

By the end of the conference, I was grateful for the extraordinary minds Tikvah had assembled, the community it had strengthened and the ambitious programs it was building. Those gathered had enjoyed an intellectual feast and received the chizuk they desperately needed.

But outside that room, millions of young Americans were consuming another meal entirely. And I fear that Tikvah’s intellectual feast cannot nourish a generation raised on a steady diet of poison.

The Game Has Changed

I listened to two podcasts this week. Dan Senor and Mark Halperin discussed the socialist challenge to the Democratic Party. Yossi Klein Halevi and Donniel Hartman discussed Naza, a film accusing Israel of genocide in Gaza that reportedly received a standing ovation lasting nearly 25 minutes.

What struck me was how four intelligent, experienced men struggled to understand movements that no longer accepted their rules of engagement.

Halperin was puzzled that Abdul El-Sayed had not moderated his positions after the midterm elections. How could he expect to accomplish anything without building relationships and cooperating with his colleagues in Washington?

But El-Sayed and the socialist movement have a different ambition. They want to replace the Democratic establishment, not become more effective members of it. Their success is measured by how far they move the party toward their positions, rather than how many colleagues they persuade to join them on individual bills.

Halperin is waiting for El-Sayed to grow into the Democratic Party. El-Sayed wants the Democratic Party to grow into his movement.

The conversation between Halevi and Hartman revealed a similar disconnect. Both men were disturbed by the extraordinary reception for Naza. They questioned its allegations, its presentation of Hamas and the evidence used to condemn Israel’s conduct in Gaza. They approached the film as serious intellectuals, seeking to separate fact from fiction.

But why would an audience applaud for nearly 25 minutes? For anything?

Such enthusiasm is difficult to explain as a careful assessment of military evidence. The film offered something more emotionally satisfying: confirmation of a worldview in which Israel is not simply guilty of particular actions but is fundamentally illegitimate.

The most radical anti-Zionist activists have moved beyond questions of Israeli military conduct. Their accusation of genocide is not confined to the Gaza war. They portray Zionism itself as a colonial and racist enterprise, Israel’s establishment as an original act of ethnic cleansing and the subsequent history of the Jewish state as a continuing campaign against Palestinian Arabs.

Under this worldview, October 7 did not begin a war that Israel was forced to fight. It merely provided another occasion for Israel to reveal its supposedly genocidal character.

As such, no military investigation can answer an accusation that begins with the existence of the Jewish state. No ceasefire can satisfy a movement that regards Zionism itself as the crime.

This presents a particular challenge for the Shalom Hartman Institute.

Hartman has devoted decades to Jewish scholarship, education and the tradition of machloket l’shem shamayim, disagreement for the sake of heaven. Its podcast, For Heaven’s Sake, reflects the belief that serious people can examine competing arguments and emerge with greater understanding.

But that tradition presumes participants recognize one another’s legitimacy. What happens when one side considers the very existence of the Jewish state an offense that no amount of evidence can justify?

Halperin and Senor expect the socialists to learn how to operate within the Democratic Party. Halevi and Hartman expect Israel’s accusers to be persuaded by facts and reason.

They have not recognized that the game itself has changed.