For two years, Europe’s movement against Israel looked like a one-way ratchet.
After October 7, governments that had resisted recognizing a Palestinian state for decades suddenly did so. Spain, Ireland, Norway and Slovenia moved in 2024, followed by additional countries in 2025. Each recognition was celebrated as permanent diplomatic progress for the Palestinians and another irreversible loss for Israel.
But then Slovenia held an election and the government that recognized Palestine lost. The new right-of-center government is dramatically more pro-Israel, with discussion of reversing Palestinian recognition and moving Slovenia’s embassy to Jerusalem.
Palestine didn’t lose Slovenia because Israel won an argument. It lost Slovenia because Slovenia changed governments.
Slovenia is small but the precedent isn’t.
France and Spain vote in 2027. Both have been important forces behind Europe’s turn against Israel. Both could move rightward. Spain, in particular, has become one of Israel’s most antagonistic governments in Western Europe under Pedro Sánchez, and parties on the right are predicted to do well.
If Slovenia is a preview, the supposedly permanent European diplomatic shift after October 7 may prove to have been something much less permanent: the policies of a particular collection of governments at a particular moment.
But before France and Spain vote comes Israeli elections in October 2026.
A new Israeli government could deprive European politicians of the convenient ability to present hostility toward Israel as merely opposition to Benjamin Netanyahu. Or a reelected Netanyahu would carry something different: a fresh democratic mandate from Israelis after October 7 and the wars that followed.
Whichever way Israeli elections go, France and Spain would be making their choices in a new political environment.
And Donald Trump will still be in the White House.
That matters particularly for Spain. Trump and Sánchez have already clashed repeatedly, while Washington remains closely aligned with Israel. A future Spanish government could therefore inherit not merely an opportunity to repair relations with Jerusalem, but an incentive to move closer to Washington at the same time.
Israel should be preparing for that possibility now. That means building relationships with plausible future governments before they take office.
Israel and pro-Israel organizations – including global evangelical groups – should be talking now with the parties, parliamentarians, foreign-policy advisers and prospective ministers who could govern France and Spain in 2027. And those conversations should extend beyond defending Israel to demonstrating what closer relations offer: defense, intelligence, technology and trade.
Israel should also have a menu ready for the morning after an election: reconsider Palestinian recognition, change hostile UN voting, reverse restrictions on Israel and deepen bilateral relations—including, where politically possible, moving embassies to Jerusalem. Importantly, in the immediate present, Israel can show the world via Slovenia the benefits of close diplomatice ties.
For the past two years, Israel has treated every European move toward Palestine as another irreversible diplomatic loss.
Slovenia just demonstrated that the ratchet works both ways.
Governments can change. And when they do, Israel should be ready to make the ratchet click backward again.

















