The menorah in the Mishkan was about the height of a person at that time. According to the rabbinic tradition in Babylonian Talmud, the menorah stood eighteen tefachim high, somewhere between four and a half and five and a half feet depending on the measure.
That is a strange choice. The Torah could have commanded a towering monument, a giant golden structure rising upward into sacred space. That is what the ancient world did. Temples were built to dwarf the worshipper. Gods were elevated into inaccessible heights, their homes designed to overwhelm and diminish those who approached. Yet when the Torah returns to the menorah in Leviticus in Parshat Emor, it commands to keep its lamps burning continually – at human scale.
The God of Israel does not seek awe; He seeks encounter. The menorah stood at eye level because holiness in Judaism is not built on distance but relationship.
Its form deepens the message. The menorah is shaped like a tree. Hammered from one piece of gold and adorned with almond blossoms, buds, and flowers, it evokes organic life, growth, and rootedness. Rashi and Nachmanides understood it as a symbol of divine wisdom and life itself. The imagery reaches backward to Eden and the Tree of Life standing at the center of creation. The menorah is that tree brought into history, planted in the center of Israel’s sacred life.
And it is more than a tree. It is time in the shape of a tree. Seven branches, seven flames, seven points of light. Like the seven days of creation, the menorah gathers into one object the architecture of existence itself. In Judaism, seven is the structure of the world. Creation unfolds in seven days. The land rests in the seventh year. Freedom resets in the seventh cycle of the jubilee. Sacred time is built in sevens, and the menorah gathers that pattern into gold.
Yet the number seven is only part of the symbolism. The structure itself carries the deeper lesson. The menorah has one central shaft, with three branches extending from one side and three from the other. Everything depends on the center. That center can be read as Shabbat itself, the seventh day that gives shape to the other six.
This is one of Judaism’s deepest interventions into human experience. Most people think of Shabbat as the end of the week, the point of collapse after six days of work. But the Torah’s vision runs in the opposite direction. Shabbat is not simply the conclusion of labor. It is the center of time. The six days are not meaningful because they arrive at rest; they are meaningful because they emerge from sanctity. The week is not six days of secular striving interrupted by a religious pause. It is six days of labor structured around a holy center.
Modern life has reversed that structure entirely. Modern man builds his life around work and treats rest as recovery. Judaism builds life around sanctity and treats work as extension. One organizes existence around productivity and squeezes meaning into the margins. The other organizes existence around holiness and allows labor to become part of that larger order. One produces burnout. The other produces orientation. The menorah, in that sense, is profoundly anti-modern. Its center is not productivity. Its center is sacred time.
The menorah’s design teaches the structure of the soul. Find the center first. Build outward second. The center is what gives coherence to everything else.
That is why the menorah stands at human height. Divine presence enters human dimensions. It stands face to face, and orients each of us to the life to lead.
This was the third assassination attempt against Donald Trump. He survived but the deeper story lies elsewhere. By the third attempt, the country barely pauses. The first attack should have shaken a nation to its core; the second should have deepened the sense of alarm. By the third, something more dangerous has taken hold: familiarity. Political violence begins to feel woven into the atmosphere, another storm system passing through.
That is the shift in American life. Political violence has moved from rupture to expectation. The country has grown accustomed to the possibility that power will be contested through force.
The evidence stretches across the last several years. There was the attempted kidnapping of Gretchen Whitmer, where executive authority itself became the target. There was the hammer attack on Paul Pelosi, where proximity to political authority was enough to invite violence. There was the arson attack on the home of Governor Josh Shapiro. There was the assassination of Charlie Kirk.
Each attack carried its own political coloration. Different grievances, different ideologies, different enemies.
Yet they share the same underlying grammar. The human being is transformed into an idea.
The governor becomes the state. The executive becomes capital. The politician becomes the regime.
That transformation is the hinge upon which violence swings. A person who stands as an abstraction for a hated system becomes easier to strike. Violence acquires moral clothing. The blow feels righteous because the target has already been converted into a symbol.
That is why the public reaction to United Healthcare CEO Brian Thompson’s killing mattered so much. The killing itself was one event. The social response revealed the deeper current. The alleged killer, Luigi Mangione, became a hero in corners of the internet. Memes spread. Fundraisers appeared. Admiration followed. A killer became an instrument of vengeance against a hated system.
It felt like the movie Joker come to life. In Joker, an unstable man carries the plot forward, but the real engine is the crowd waiting to celebrate him. The mob grants moral legitimacy to the violence. The killer becomes a vessel for collective resentment.
That is the deeper American drift. Violence increasingly invites sympathy, reinterpretation, and applause. The act becomes secondary to the story society tells itself about why the victim represented something worth destroying.
This can be seen in the Middle East as well.
Palestinian political culture offers a longer and starker example of how this process unfolds. For roughly twenty-five years, polling by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research has repeatedly shown majority support for violence against Jewish civilians inside Israel. This stretches back before the Gaza blockade and before the present war. The permission structure came first.
PCPSR poll from October 2003 asking whether Palestinian Arabs supported armed attacks against civilians in Israel
Then politics followed.
In 2006, Palestinians elected Hamas to a parliamentary majority, fully aware of its openly antisemitic and eliminationist charter. October 7 emerged from that political soil. The massacre fit within a culture that had long accepted the killing of Jewish civilians as part of political struggle.
And the celebration reached far beyond Gaza. American campuses, Western cities, and activist spaces erupted with demonstrations that folded the massacre into broader narratives of liberation. The same reduction had already taken place. Jews had been recast as symbols of systems: colonialism, finance, whiteness, Western power, institutional dominance.
Rep. Rashida Tlaib (D-MI) goes on antisemitic rant at Democratic Socialists of America conference, invoking Nazi imagery of Jews “operating behind the curtain… to make money off of racism.”
This is the ancient machinery of antisemitism. Jews become the human face of structural resentment.
The FBI hate-crime statistics show the physical consequences of that social logic. Americans often picture hate crime through property damage: a swastika painted on a synagogue, a church defaced, a mosque vandalized. Yet for more than a decade, the majority of hate crimes in America have been crimes against persons.
In 2019, 62.6 percent of hate-crime offenses targeted people. In 2020, the FBI recorded 7,750 crimes against persons, with nearly half involving direct physical assault. The figures jumped to over 11,000 in 2023 and 2024, with Jewish accounting for the vast majority of hate crimes by religion.
The reason sits in plain sight. Jews occupy a permanent place in political imagination as concentrated power: finance, media, institutions, influence. Even when stated softly, the accusation remains the same: too much influence, too much reach, too much control.
Once power itself is treated as morally suspect, violence against those imagined to embody it starts to feel cleansing. Society begins teaching itself that rage against elites is a form of justice. Institutions become enemies. Authority becomes corruption. Violence becomes political purification.
That moral structure echoes the French Revolution. The crowd gathers. The elite are marched into the square. Their status dissolves. Their destruction becomes public theater.
That is the destination of normalized violence.
The warning sign is larger than the incident. The warning lies in the crowd, in the cultural ecosystem that grants permission, supplies applause, and tells itself that the target stood for something hateful enough to justify blood.
Society has normalized violence as the media and school systems falsely rebranded America as a deeply unfair caste system. In the masses attempt for a complete redistribution of power and wealth, those with or with perceived power – politicians and Jews – will be open game for the angry mob.
There was something fitting about Lior Raz standing in Chappaqua, New York last night raising money for Magen David Adom. Raz built his career dramatizing the hunt for terrorists. Magen David Adom exists for the moments after the hunt fails.
Lior Raz being interviewed at a fundraiser for Magen David Adom in Chappaqua, NY April 29, 2026 (photo: First One Through)
For those unfamiliar with Raz, he is more than an actor. Before becoming one of Israel’s most recognizable cultural figures, he served in an undercover Israeli military unit operating inside Arab communities, gathering intelligence and carrying out operations in hostile environments. He grew up with Iraqi and Algerian parents speaking Arabic, making him deeply bi-cultural in Jewish and Arab worlds. That experience and background became the foundation for Fauda, the global hit he co-created and stars in, a drama centered on Israeli undercover units hunting terrorists in the West Bank and Gaza.
What made Fauda different was never simply its action but its realism. Israelis and Palestinian Arabs were not rendered as symbols, but as human beings moving through an intimate, brutal conflict where ideology, family, fear, and violence occupy the same space. For international audiences it was compelling fiction. For Israelis and Stateless Arabs from Palestine (SAPs) it often felt closer to lived reality.
Then October 7 collapsed whatever distance remained between fiction and reality.
At the fundraiser, Raz put words to what that rupture did to Israel.
Israel, he said, is living in trauma, not PTSD. It was not an echo of horror but the continuation of it.
It was the most important thing said all night because it captured something essential about the country after October 7. PTSD belongs to memory. Trauma belongs to the present. PTSD is what remains after danger has passed. Trauma is what happens when danger tears through your assumptions and reorganizes how you live.
That is Israel now.
Lior Raz being interviewed at a fundraiser for Magen David Adom in Chappaqua, NY April 29, 2026 (photo: First One Through)
The hostages are home or accounted for. The war has shifted phases. But the rupture remains embedded in Israeli life. The confidence that catastrophe could be anticipated and contained has been broken. Every family understands more intimately how quickly ordinary life can split into irreversible loss. The danger may have changed form, but the nervous system of the country remains altered.
That is where Magen David Adom enters the story.
If Fauda is about the front edge of violence—the raid, the chase, the interception—Magen David Adom lives on the back edge: the ambulance, the paramedic, the trauma room, the blood bank, the race to preserve life after violence has already landed. Security exists to stop attacks. Emergency medicine exists for when stopping fails.
Raz spoke with particular pride about what Magen David Adom represents: Jews, Christians, Druze, and Muslims working side by side to save lives. In a region where identity so often organizes conflict, MDA operates at the level beneath identity, at the essence of humanity. No politics, no theology, no tribal sorting. Just the oldest civilizational imperative there is: preserve life.
It is one of Israel’s deepest strengths that even under permanent security pressure, its emergency institutions remain organized around life itself.
Raz also looked forward. The next season of Fauda which will come out in a few months, he said, will directly reflect October 7 and the years after, with half of it set in Marseille, France. That choice is revealing. Marseille is one of Europe’s great pressure-point cities, where migration, communal fragmentation, criminality, radicalization, and fractured civic identity collide. It is a city where many of the tensions Israel has lived with for decades are becoming visible in European form.
The movement of Fauda into Europe suggests something larger. The Israeli condition is no longer entirely Israeli. The fractures Israel has lived with for decades—terror, divided loyalties, imported ideological battles, fear in public life—are increasingly visible across Western democracies. Israel was simply earlier, home to 45% of global Jewry. The anti-Jewish attacks and growing anti-Western attacks are everywhere.
When Raz was pressed on American politics, he declined to engage. He understood the trap of America’s partisan machinery and would have no part of it. He was there to fight violence from wherever it came from, not from a single ideology.
At an event raising money for ambulances, blood banks, and emergency responders, it became clear that this too belongs to the same mission.
Raz is known for Fauda, for portraying the hunt for terrorists, the intelligence work, the raids, the violence used to stop violence. But that is only the outer layer. Beneath it lies something older and deeper.
The mission is to save lives.
To save lives in Israel when violence breaks through. To protect Jewish life abroad when antisemitism rises. To defend the perimeter and preserve the people. These are not separate missions. They are one.
For most of Jewish history, Jews endured violence dependent on the mercy or restraint of others. Now there is a Jewish state with power, intelligence capabilities, and institutions of rescue, carrying with it not only sovereignty but obligation. That obligation no longer ends at Israel’s borders. A Jew threatened in Paris, attacked in New York, harassed in London, or targeted in Melbourne enters the same moral universe.
The perimeter has widened.
Fauda may be about counterterrorism and Magen David Adom may be about emergency medicine. Together, they represent the fight against antisemitism which lies in the same ancient Jewish imperative: protect life, preserve the people, continue.
That may define the ever-present trauma among Jewry today: the need to constantly think about personal and communal safety, without the calm to simply sit at a cafe or send one’s kids to school and purely enjoy life’s moments.
The world now knows what Gaza costs to rebuild: $71.4 billion. What it still does not know is what Gaza is supposed to become.
That is the number in the 2026 Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA), produced by the United Nations with the World Bank and the European Union in April 2026. It is a vast and meticulous ledger of destruction, broken into sectors, sub-sectors, losses, and needs. It is also a revealing document, because the table tells you what the world thinks Gaza is.
A physical problem.
Housing: $16.21 billion.
Health: $10.03 billion.
Agriculture: $10.49 billion.
Commerce and industry: $8.99 billion.
Social protection: $5.78 billion.
Education: $4.71 billion.
Water and sanitation: $4.24 billion.
Energy: $2.73 billion.
Transport: $1.54 billion.
Total direct damages: $35.2 billion. Total economic losses: $22.7 billion. Total reconstruction needs: $71.4 billion.
RDNA assessment of cost to rebuild Gaza, April 2026
It is a complete inventory of physical devastation. Buildings crushed into powder. Water systems ruptured. Hospitals crippled. Roads fractured. Farms destroyed. Markets emptied.
The UN has priced the debris.
It has even priced the removal of the debris: $1.7 billion just to clear more than 68 million metric tons of wreckage.
But the table reveals something else.
There is no line item for civic reconstruction. That is the missing category. There is something for “social protection” and even calls to improve “gender equality, and social inclusion,” but a refocus on building a healthy culture is absent.
RDNA report on rebuilding Gaza, April 2026
Not because it is unimportant. Because it is the hard. And the public may still be unwilling to accept it.
Civic reconstruction is the rebuilding of the political and social architecture of a society: education, norms, legitimacy, coexistence, rule of law, pluralism, and the delegitimization of political violence as a governing method.
Without it, reconstruction is replacement. There will be new buildings but the same “deformity” of ideology, to quote James Zogby in his testimony to the United Nations in June 2023.
Civic reconstruction requires power. And commitment. The UN has frameworks, funding channels, and institutional tools. It does not have sovereignty. It cannot rewrite a society by decree.
And that only makes the omission more consequential.
The UN report itself hints at the deeper crisis. It states that Gaza’s human development has been pushed back 77 years, with the Human Development Index projected to collapse to 0.339, the lowest level ever recorded.
Human development is not just electricity and sewage. It is the civic conditions that make human flourishing possible.
The report includes gender equality. Social inclusion. Employment. Governance.
All necessary.
But governance itself is budgeted at just $530 million, and that is administrative. Municipal function, institutional capacity and service delivery. Not civic transformation.
That distinction matters.
There is no budget line for:
coexistence education
curriculum reform
dismantling political incitement
independent civil society
women’s civic and legal empowerment beyond emergency protection
minority rights
ideological deradicalization
That is not a technical omission. It is the central question.
Postwar Germany was rebuilt through more than roads and housing. It went through total defeat, disarmament, a state monopoly on force, educational overhaul, and the systematic delegitimization of the ideology that had led it into catastrophe.
Postwar Japan followed the same path: constitutional redesign, political restructuring, educational transformation, and a new civic contract.
The physical debris mattered. But so did the ideological debris.
And ideological debris is harder to clear.
It does not sit in the streets. It lives in textbooks, political institutions, media ecosystems, religious messaging, and the stories a society tells itself about violence and legitimacy.
That debris remains.
The UN has measured Gaza’s physical debris. It has priced the roads, the hospitals, the pipes, the farms, the power grid. What it has not priced is the ideological wreckage underneath them.
That is the danger.
Physical reconstruction without civic reconstruction does not produce peace. It produces restoration.
And restoration means returning to the conditions that made destruction inevitable.
Schools can teach coexistence or sanctify martyrdom. Hospitals can preserve life or sustain armed rule. Roads can carry commerce or carry war.
A rebuilt Gaza can become the foundation of peace or the staging ground for the next war.
You can clear 68 million tons of rubble and still leave the most dangerous ruins standing.
The new play Giant has revived the scandal of Roald Dahl, the beloved children’s author whose antisemitism became inseparable from his legacy. Dahl’s hatred had its roots in an obsession with Israel, especially after the 1982 Lebanon War, which hardened into something older and darker: Jews as a collective object of blame. Political fury dissolved the line between a state and a people.
Matt Chun shows where that road now leads.
Chun is an Australian children’s book illustrator, part of a profession entrusted with shaping how children understand innocence, cruelty, and empathy. But when Jews were murdered at a Jewish Hanukkah celebration in Bondi, his response in an article title “Never mourn a fascist,” exposed something far beyond political critique: raw antisemitism. The victims were neither Israelis nor soldiers. They were Australian Jews gathered in communal celebration, among them a ten-year-old girl. Chun denied their innocence and treated their deaths as politically qualified, as though Jewish identity itself diminished the claim to grief.
People stand near flowers laid as a tribute at Bondi Beach to honour the victims of a mass shooting that targeted a Hanukkah celebration at Bondi Beach on Sunday, in Sydney, Australia, December 16, 2025. (credit: REUTERS/Flavio Brancaleone)
That marks the evolution. Dahl saw war and blamed Jews. Chun sees Jews and explains away their murder.
That is why the cancellation of Chun’s forthcoming children’s book Bila by University of Queensland Press was fitting. Children’s books are an act of trust. Parents place them in their children’s hands believing that the people behind them understand something fundamental about innocence and human worth. A creator who cannot recognize the innocence of a murdered Jewish child at a Hanukkah celebration has forfeited any claim to shape the moral imagination of children.
Dahl’s antisemitism traveled through Israel before landing on Jews. Chun begins with Jews.
Chun wrote that “lands have been pillaged, poisoned, desecrated, and set ablaze by colonisers,” as he celebrates the slaughter of people at a holiday party. Alas, he is only the latest author instilling venom in the ink of books being marketed to children.
When rabbis portray Israel as a moral problem instead of a Jewish inheritance
Two progressive rabbis – Sharon Brous and David Ingber – sat before a packed Jewish audience in San Diego for a taping of the podcast Being Jewish with Jonah Platt, to wrestle with a distinctly modern Jewish dilemma: how does a tradition forged in exile process the return of Jewish power?
The subject was the rabbinate and Israel, but the deeper argument was Judaism itself.
The language was familiar: fear, shame, democracy, moral crisis. The question underneath it was older than the state and older than Zionism itself. What exactly is Judaism when Jews are sovereign again – and what does that mean for diaspora Jews?
That question is increasingly dividing Jewish life.
For years the pattern has been visible in polling, synagogue life, philanthropy, and communal politics. The further left a Jew moves politically, the more likely that Jew is to become publicly critical of Israel. The less traditional the Jewish framework, the more likely that criticism expands beyond policy into discomfort with Jewish statehood itself. Orthodox Jews criticize Israeli governments all the time, often fiercely, but they rarely place Jewish national existence itself in the dock.
That difference is not merely political. It is theological. It is civilizational.
Because traditional Judaism has always answered the question of Jewish identity in integrated terms: God, Torah, peoplehood, and land. These are particular to the Jewish people. They embody one structure. Remove one and the architecture strains. Remove the land and Judaism survives, but in suspension.
Diaspora Judaism became one of history’s great civilizational achievements, but it was always an adaptation to rupture. The prayerbook points toward Jerusalem. The festivals move according to the agricultural rhythms of the Land of Israel. The fast days mourn national destruction. The closing line of the seder and of Yom Kippur pushes in one direction only: next year in Jerusalem.
That was never metaphor. It was memory preserved as architecture.
For traditional Jews, Jewish self-rule is not simply politics. It is Jewish history restored. Such belief does not make every Israeli government wise or righteous. Jews argue bitterly over borders, settlements, courts, wars, and coalitions. But beneath those arguments lies a premise that remains fixed: Jewish political agency is indispensable.
Progressive – and especially non-Orthodox – Judaism increasingly begins somewhere else.
Its center of gravity is ethical universalism. Its first question is increasingly not what preserves Jewish continuity, but what satisfies universal justice. That instinct has deep Jewish roots. The prophets placed moral obligation at the center of covenantal life. But prophets do not run borders.
States do.
States defend territory, absorb casualties, deter enemies, and make violent decisions under imperfect conditions. Sovereignty stains the hands. Once universal ethics become the supreme framework, the Jewish state itself becomes vulnerable to indictment.
That is what the Brous–Ingber exchange revealed with unusual clarity.
And it was revealing precisely because it did not end in one room.
Their first conversation exposed a tension neither side could settle. Sharon Brous spoke from the prophetic register of progressive Judaism, where Judaism is primarily moral witness, conscience, and justice. David Ingber, while sharing much of that moral vocabulary, kept returning to something older and deeper: peoplehood, continuity, solidarity, historical necessity.
The disagreement lingered.
Brous later acknowledged discomfort with how the exchange unfolded, and the conversation resumed in a second round on Jonah Platt’s podcast. That itself was revealing. One debate became two because the argument underneath it could not be resolved by clarifying policy or refining moral critique. The disagreement was structural.
And in that second conversation, the divide remained.
Brous continued pressing the prophetic burden, insisting that Jewish moral credibility depends on confronting Jewish power when it acts unjustly. Ingber continued defending something prior to critique itself: the necessity of Jewish collective power in a world that has repeatedly shown its appetite for Jewish vulnerability, especially in light of the widespread antisemitism today.
One critiques Israel primarily as a moral actor, the other defends Israel first as a historical necessity and only then wrestles with its conduct.
It is the difference between inheritance and indictment.
And this internal Jewish struggle is increasingly being exported into the wider world, where it is eagerly consumed.
This week in the United Kingdom, leading progressive rabbis warned that Israel’s political direction poses an existential threat to Judaism itself, tied to the publication of their new book. The phrase was startling.
Israel as an existential threat to Judaism.
For two thousand years, existential threats to Judaism had names: the Roman destruction of Jerusalem, the Crusades, the Inquisition, pogroms, the Holocaust, Soviet repression, the expulsions from Arab lands.
Statelessness itself was the existential condition.
Now, for growing sectors of progressive non-Orthodox Jewish leadership, the Jewish state itself is increasingly being cast as the danger.
That is more than criticism. That is inversion.
And notice who was eager to amplify it.
The Guardian, a British publication whose editorial posture toward Israel has long been sharply critical, gave the book and its thesis prominent space. That matters because internal Jewish dissent carries unique public utility in anti-Israel discourse. Criticism from outside can be dismissed as hostility. Criticism from inside acquires the authority of confession.
Progressive Jewish critique often assumes its audience shares its covenantal investment in Jewish survival. The wider world often hears something simpler: if even rabbis are indicting the Jewish state, the case against it must already be proven.
That is one of anti-Zionism’s most valuable currencies: Jewish testimony against Jewish power.
Not because Jewish dissent is illegitimate. Jewish argument is one of Judaism’s oldest arts. But once internal critique detaches from internal solidarity, it stops functioning as family argument and starts functioning as prosecutorial evidence.
The family dispute becomes public exhibit.
And this is where traditional Jewish memory diverges sharply from progressive Jewish moral instinct.
Traditional Jews remember something progressive Jewish politics often struggles to metabolize: the central danger of Jewish history was never Jewish power: It was Jewish powerlessness.
The Holocaust was not a lesson in the abuse of Jewish power. It was a lesson in the consequences of Jewish defenselessness.
Then came 1948 and Jewish agency returned.
And within years, the map of Jewish history changed. Ancient Jewish communities across Iraq, Yemen, Egypt, and Morocco collapsed into expulsion, flight, and dispossession. Hundreds of thousands found refuge in Israel.
That memory disciplines judgment. It teaches realism.
Progressive Jewish consciousness inherited a different lesson from modernity: nationalism corrupts, power must be constrained, minorities must maintain moral vigilance.
There is wisdom in that inheritance – as a modifier, not as a ruling ethos. A beleaguered minority does not have the luxury of abandoning all rights and power to satisfy the mob.
That is what Zionism answered, not abstractly but operationally.
German Jews once believed they had solved history. They were cultured, integrated, patriotic, indispensable.
History did not care.
American Jews should similarly be cautious with assumptions of permanence.
Because beneath every synagogue fight, every anguished podcast, every progressive Jewish book tour, lies the same civilizational argument: is Judaism an inheritance to preserve, or a moral vocabulary to deploy?
These have become competing theories of Jewish survival.
For two thousand years Jews prayed toward Zion because history taught them exile was fragile. Progressive Judaism increasingly asks whether Israel deserves that loyalty, while traditional Judaism believes the land is central to Judaism and disagreements are best managed internally.
Whether in public or private discussions, the policies of Israel are becoming an exhibit in the philosophical rift between progressive and traditional Judaism.
Claude Monet (1840-1926) spent his life chasing light.
He helped launch Impressionism by shifting painting away from fixed objects and toward the unstable conditions of the act of seeing itself. Through a variety of subjects – haystacks, cathedrals, train stations, coastlines – Monet returned again and again, capturing what never held still: morning light, evening shadow, fog, heat, atmosphere. The object remained. Perception changed.
And then, late in life, he turned almost entirely to water.
At Claude Monet’s House and Gardens in Giverny, France, Monet painted the pond in his garden more than 250 times, producing the vast Water Lilies series that consumed the final decades of his life. These were far more than decorative studies of flowers on water. They became his great final act, culminating in enormous panoramic canvases so large they stop functioning like ordinary paintings.
They become environments.
Stand inside the oval rooms at Musée de l’Orangerie in Paris and something unusual happens: you lose orientation.
Musée de l’Orangerie in Paris
There is no horizon line to stabilize the eye. No clear beginning or end. Water stretches outward without boundary. Sky descends into the pond as reflection. Trees fracture into color and light. Surface and depth collapse into one another.
You are no longer looking at a pond. You are inside a field of undifferentiated perception.
That is what makes the late Water Lilies so unsettling. And beautiful.
Monet strips away the architecture of the ordinary. In most painting, the world arrives in layers: foreground, middle ground, background. Here, those distinctions dissolve. What is above enters below. What is solid becomes liquid. What seems stable flickers and shifts.
The eye searches for boundaries and cannot quite find them. One is left with colors, sometimes sharp and other times diffuse, as solid and liquid vie for primacy.
And that is where the Bible begins. In tohu va-vohu.
The phrase describes a world before distinction. Existence is present, but unformed. Darkness over the deep. Water everywhere. No stable land, no horizon, no orienting line for human perception in the world before humans.
A world new and present, but unreadable.
Genesis begins in the same visual condition Monet creates: immersion in undifferentiated reality.
In the Bible, God focuses on creation through separation. Light from darkness. Waters above from waters below. Sea from dry land. Creation is manifest by distinction. Reality becomes intelligible because boundaries emerge.
This is the radical claim of Genesis: the natural world emerged from chaos, from the topsy-turvy world of tohu va-vohu. And Monet performs the reverse. He takes the natural world and loosens its boundaries, dissolving it back into its primal elements: light, water, color, reflection.
And yet it remains nature. That is the wonder of the Water Lilies.
They allow us to see the natural world as if it were returning to its chaotic first condition, before edges hardened, before boundaries settled, before the eye could fully distinguish one thing from another.
Monet, at the end of his life, took the simple beauty of his backyard garden and let humanity imagine the entire natural world at the moment of creation, before there were objects, before perception was even possible.
It was a remarkable end of a career for the gifted painter who chased light throughout his days, to conclude at the very First Day.
This week, Israel began bringing the first members of the Bnei Menashe community from northeast India to Israel, the latest chapter in one of the most improbable stories in Jewish history. These are Jews who have long understood themselves as descendants of the Tribe of Manasseh, one of the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel, exiled by the Assyrian Empire nearly 2,700 years ago. Across centuries, empires, languages, and continents, they preserved fragments of ritual, memory, and identity tied to ancient Israel. In modern times, after study, rabbinic engagement, and formal recognition, thousands have made aliyah. Hundreds more are now on their way. For the Jewish world, it is an extraordinary scene: a people scattered to the farthest reaches of the earth still finding their way home.
That is the Jewish story in miniature.
Exile was never meant to be permanent. The Jewish calendar, Jewish prayer, and Jewish memory are saturated with return. From The Hebrew Bible to the modern Zionist movement, the idea of ingathering has been the central thread of Jewish continuity. Operation Wings of Dawn is not an immigration program in the ordinary sense. It is the continuation of that ancient civilizational arc.
It is also a reminder that Jewish peoplehood never fit modern racial categories. Jews came back to Israel from Ethiopia, from Iraq, from Yemen, from Russia, from France, and now again from India. Different languages. Different appearances. Different histories of exile. One people.
That should be a remarkable human story.
And yet, in some corners of the media world, it became something else.
Quds News Network ran a story framing the arrival as a “settlement push” of “new colonizers” in northern “Occupied Palestine”, reducing the Bnei Menashe to instruments of a political project rather than recognizing them as Jews returning to join the Jewish people in the Jewish state. The framing is familiar: Jewish return is recoded as colonial expansion.
This is not an isolated habit of language. Across anti-Israel activist media and parts of the NGO ecosystem, Jewish presence in Israel is increasingly interpreted through a “settler-colonial” framework in “Occupied Palestine,” meaning anywhere in Israel. Amnesty International’s apartheid framework leans heavily on this vocabulary, turning Jewish sovereignty itself into a structural offense rather than a legitimate act of national self-determination. That language then migrates outward, shaping how journalists, activists, and political movements speak about Jews in Israel. The result is a moral inversion in which Jewish return becomes aggression by definition.
And this is where the word colonizer collapses under its own weight.
Colonialism has an actual meaning. It is when an imperial center sends its people outward to dominate foreign land for extraction and rule. Britain in India. Spain in the Americas. France in Algeria.
Operation Wings of Dawn is the reverse movement: A dispersed people carrying an ancient memory of Israel, choosing to gather into the one Jewish homeland.
Calling that colonialism empties the word of meaning.
And the asymmetry is impossible to ignore.
When Palestinian Arabs preserve the memory of villages lost 77 years ago, the world treats it as sacred inheritance, a claim passed from generation to generation. Even when those same Arabs live just a few miles away from their grandparents’ homes, in the same land, with the same people, language and culture, people advocate for their relocation.
Yet when Jews preserve the memory of exile in distant lands and act on it, the same world increasingly calls it colonization.
That difference tells you everything.
The issue has never been whether Jews are European or Middle Eastern, white or brown, indigenous or diasporic. The Bnei Menashe expose how flimsy those categories always were. Indian Jews arriving in Israel should shatter the lazy caricature of Zionism as European implantation.
Instead, the caricature simply repeats the mantra:
A Jew from Poland returns as a colonizer. A Jew from Iraq returns as a colonizer. A Jew from Ethiopia returns as a colonizer. A Jew from India returns as a colonizer.
For those committed to denying Jewish belonging, even a homecoming from India must be rewritten as invasion.
When Israel declared independence in 1948, it had roughly 717,000 Jews and roughly 156,000 Arab citizens and residents. Those numbers were small, but what they carried was enormous: the ambition to reverse two thousand years of Jewish dispersion and gather a scattered people back into sovereignty.
Yet the first demographic fact that emerges from Israel’s modern history cuts against so much of the political mythology surrounding it. Since 1948, Israel’s Arab minority expanded at a faster proportional rate than its Jewish majority. The Jewish population grew from 717,000 to nearly 8 million, roughly elevenfold. Israel’s Arab population grew from 156,000 to more than 2.1 million, more than thirteenfold.
That fact strips away one of the central distortions in the debate over Israel. The rise of the Jewish state did not require the disappearance of its Arab minority. Quite the opposite. Israel’s Arab population expanded dramatically under Israeli sovereignty. Two populations grew inside the same state, but through entirely different engines. The Jewish story was one of ingathering, especially during the early years.
Today, Israel stands at more than 10.2 million people, nearly 8 million Jews and more than 2.1 million Arabs. A state born in scarcity became a fully formed society. But the road from 1948 to 2026 can best be understood through four distinct demographic phases: ingathering, expansion, retention, and preservation.
The first phase was ingathering. At first, Israel was an immigration state, and its earliest years were powered by catastrophe. The survivors of Europe came first, the broken remnant of the Holocaust arriving in a country still fighting its first war. Then came the collapse of Jewish life across the Arab world. Ancient Jewish communities in Iraq, Yemen, Morocco, Egypt, and Libya emptied under expulsion, violence, and state pressure. More than 800,000 Jews left the Arab world, many rebuilding their lives in Israel.
Then came the Soviet opening. The collapse of the Soviet Union released nearly one million Jews into the largest migration wave since the founding of the state. Europe’s destruction, the Arab world’s expulsion, and the Soviet opening formed the three great waves of Jewish ingathering. Three different historical ruptures, one destination. That is how Jewish Israel was built.
While Jewish Israel was growing through migration, Israel’s Arab population was growing through birth. Higher fertility and falling mortality created uninterrupted expansion over decades. That is why the proportional growth of Israel’s Arab population exceeded the proportional growth of the Jewish population.
Then the second phase began: expansion. At first, Jewish growth depended on aliyah. Over time, it depended increasingly on birth. The immigrants became citizens, the citizens became parents, and the children of refugees became the country itself. The engine of Jewish demographic growth shifted from the airport to the maternity ward. That is the deepest demographic transition in Israel’s history.
In 2025, Israel recorded approximately 177,000 births. Immigration that year stood at roughly 24,600. Births now outnumber immigration by more than seven to one. What would have been unimaginable in 1948 has become ordinary in 2026. Israel began as a refuge. It now reproduces itself.
That changes the meaning of the state. Political Israel started as the answer to Jewish vulnerability, a place Jews could flee to when the world closed. That remains true. But demographically, it is no longer Israel’s primary function. Israel is no longer merely where Jews go when exile fails. It is where Jewish continuity principally lives.
And here, another old assumption collapsed. For decades, Israeli politics was shaped by demographic anxiety: would Arab fertility permanently outpace Jewish fertility? Would a demographic clock eventually run down the Jewish majority? That fear shaped strategy, borders, and diplomacy. For years, the numbers seemed to support it.
Then the numbers changed. Arab fertility declined as Arab society modernized. Jewish fertility remained unusually strong for an advanced economy. Today, Jewish fertility has reached parity with, and in some years slightly exceeded, Arab fertility. The demographic trajectory shifted. A generation of political strategy was shaped by a demographic clock that slowed while everyone kept hearing it tick.
Fertility Shift
1990 Arab █████ Jewish ███ 2026 Arab ███ Jewish ████
But demographic success creates its own new challenge.
For most of Israeli history, migration remained positive. Even when aliyah slowed, more Jews came than left. That changed in the last two years. In 2022, Israel absorbed more than 74,000 immigrants, driven heavily by war in Ukraine and departures from Russia. That surge faded quickly. By 2024 and 2025, net migration turned negative – more Israelis left than new immigrants arrived.
This is not a demographic crisis. Births still overwhelm migration losses, and Israel continues to grow. But the Zionist test has changed. For decades, the question was how many Jews Israel could gather. Now the question is how many it can keep.
The founding generations came because they had to. Future generations stay because they choose to. That is a different kind of national test. And the retention question is not merely numerical. If those leaving are disproportionately engineers, doctors, founders, investors, and elite military talent, the demographic issue changes shape. A state can absorb numerical loss. It feels the loss of capability much faster.
Above all these numbers sits the larger civilizational shift. In 1948, around six percent of world Jewry lived in Israel. Today, around 45% does. Soon it may be the majority.
Share of World Jewry Living in Israel 1948 ██ 6% 1970 ████ 18% 1990 ███████ 30% 2010 ██████████ 42% 2026 ████████████ 45%
There is one more demographic question hanging over Israel in 2026, larger than fertility, migration, or retention. It sits beneath almost every diplomatic formula and every argument about the future of the conflict.
The question is the scale and meaning of the Stateless Arabs from Palestine (SAPs) having a “right of return.”
For decades, the Palestinian Authority and the United Nations have insisted on a “right of return” for Palestinian “refugees” and their descendants. The number most commonly cited is roughly 5.9 million. That number matters because it clarifies what the argument actually means in demographic terms.
Israel today has roughly 10.2 million people. Add 5.9 million Palestinian Arabs to that number and the demographic map changes overnight. Israel would become a country of more than 16 million people. Its Arab population would jump from 2.1 million to more than 8 million. Its Jewish population would remain just under 8 million. The Jewish majority would collapse into parity or slightly minority status.
That is not a marginal adjustment. It is a structural transformation of the state itself.
Put into historical perspective, the scale becomes even sharper. In 1948, Israel’s Arab population stood at roughly 156,000. By 2026, it had already grown to more than 2.1 million, more than thirteenfold growth, already exceeding Jewish proportional growth over the same period. Add 5.9 million more, and that Arab population would stand at more than 8 million, representing more than fiftyfold growth since the founding of the state.
A “right of return” on this scale is not simply an immigration proposal, already stripping Israel a basic right of sovereignty to determine who to admit into the country. It further demands that the Jewish State cease to be one.
That is why this issue forms the fourth demographic challenge: preservation. Preservation of the demographic framework that allowed Jewish self-determination to return after two thousand years of dispersion and discrimination.
For most of Jewish history, survival meant enduring dispersion. In Israel, survival became concentration, then continuity, and now choice. The next phase may determine whether it remains preservation.
Very few countries have grown by over 10 times since 1948, and none in the developed “Global North”, with Australia and Canada leading the group at 2.5x and 1.9x, respectively (no European country even doubled its population). In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region which saw explosive growth due to the discovery of oil, no country has had the minority populations grow faster than the majority.
Israel is a true anomaly, a developed country with explosive growth, sitting in the MENA region which suppresses the growth of minority groups but the Jewish State still saw oversaw a faster growth of non-Jews. Despite the basic facts, the world still pressures the country to admit even more people adding to the population density, and with minorities who never lived in the country, in particular, undermining the demographic status quo.
As Israel considers its plans for the years ahead, retaining educated talent and ending the so-called SAP “right of return” rank as the leading causes to maintain a thriving democracy.
At the center of Achrei Mot, on Yom Kippur, two goats stand side by side. Both identical and indistinguishable. Then, a lottery is cast.
If all you wanted was forgiveness for sins, one goat would be enough. Yet the Torah insists on two.
Forgiveness is easy. Change is not.
We like to believe wrongdoing is a series of isolated acts. You did something wrong, you regret it, you fix it, you move on. Clean, contained, manageable. It is how legal systems work and how people prefer to understand themselves.
It is also incomplete.
Most failure is not a moment. It is a pattern. It accumulates, settles in, becomes familiar, then invisible.
The altar can address the act. It cannot address the drift.
Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik drew a distinction that cuts through the ritual with precision. There is kapparah, atonement, and there is taharah, purification. A person can be forgiven and still remain unchanged. The ledger is cleared, but the self is not.
The first goat is about repair. Something was broken and must be restored. There is acknowledgment, cost, and a return toward the center. Without that, nothing holds.
But even after the offering, something remains unresolved. What about the part of you that made the act possible in the first place? What about the force that will bring you back to the same place again?
The second goat answers without pretending to solve. It is not elevated nor transformed. It is taken and removed, sent beyond the camp into a space outside structure and control. The Torah does something more honest than erasure. It refuses to let that force sit at the center.
Rabbi Jonathan Sacks drew the line just as sharply. The Torah distinguishes between what you did and who you are. The act can be real, heavy, even defining in its moment, and still not be allowed to define you going forward.
That distinction is fragile. Without it, people fall into two familiar traps. One is denial, the instinct to send everything away, to blame, to project, to say the problem lives somewhere else. The other is paralysis, the belief that failure is permanent, that the stain cannot be lifted, that there is no meaningful way forward.
Two goats, not one, because one would allow the situation to settle in a bad place.
The first says you are responsible. The second says you are not reducible to what you did. Hold only the first and you collapse under your past. Hold only the second and you lose accountability.
Together they force something far less comfortable.
You are forgiven, but the forces that led you there still exist.
There is no promise here that the internal engine disappears. No claim that a single day resets human nature. The ritual does not erase memory or capacity. It offers something more restrained and more demanding. The sin is acknowledged, gathered, and pushed to the margins. No longer central, no longer defining, but not imaginary either.
You walk forward without it at your core. You do not pretend it was never there.
Two goats, identical at the start, divided by fate. One ascends, one disappears, and between them stands a person who has to live with both truths at once.
You can be restored. You are still capable of returning.
In a world where scapegoats have become the rage, let us all relearn and teach the world that the just path forward requires both atonement and purification of self.
First One Through 